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1 Introduction  
“No man is an island, entire of itself;  
every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main” 
John Donne 
English clergyman and poet (1572 - 1631) 
 
Since the dawn of evolutionary theory (Darwin, 1859, 1871), schol-
ars have been applying the laws of natural selection to research on 
physiological structures. Since this time, it has been suggested that the 
defining features of a species, such as a turtle’s resilient shell or a pi-
geon’s inner compass, result from undirected evolution rather than 
purposeful creation. However, many scholars have been reluctant to 
apply the laws of natural selection to humans, particularly human 
minds. Thus, the study of the human mind long remained within the 
domain of psychologists, philosophers, and theologians. 
However, since the second half of the 20th century, with the advent 
of ethology (Lorenz, 1965; Tinbergen, 1951), evolutionary theory has 
slowly been conquering the realm of psychology, and scholars now con-
sider that animal and human traits, emotions, cognitions, and behav-
iors result from variation, inheritance, and selection (Brown, 1991; Har-
low, 1971; Seligman, & Hager, 1972; Wilson, 1975). This recent consid-
eration also implies a shift of perspective from proximate explanations 
(how, i.e., the causal mechanisms) to ultimate explanations (why, i.e., 
the fitness consequences) of behavior (Tinbergen, 1963). 
Many traits, emotions, cognitions, and behaviors have been con-
sistently explained and predicted using the laws of natural selection. 
However, there is one last secure stronghold, withstanding many evolu-
tionary explanations: human prosociality (West, El Mouden, & Gardner, 
2011). Charles Darwin was astonished by frequent display of virtue and 
bravery in humans, and he struggled to fathom morality in terms of 
natural selection (Darwin, 1871). Why do people perform good deeds? 
Why do people take costs and run risks to bestow benefits upon others? 
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In the following sections, I will provide a short account of two clas-
sic evolutionary explanations of human prosociality, altruism, and co-
operation, particularly with regard to the shortcomings concerning the 
explanatory power of these principles for many real-life instances of 
human prosociality. As an extension and alternative, I will introduce the 
idea of biological markets (Noë, & Hammerstein, 1994, 1995) and sug-
gest how prosociality can be explained as a result of signaling mecha-
nisms. I will conclude this chapter with a discussion of some theoretical 
considerations underlying my research and provide an overview of the 
following empirical work. 
1.1 Classic evolutionary explanations of human prosociality 
In this chapter, I will use the terms altruism, cooperation, and 
prosociality interchangeably to describe the costly behaviors of a send-
er, which grant immediate benefits to a receiver. West, Griffin, and 
Gardner (2007, p. 662) define altruism as “a behavior that is costly to 
the actor and beneficial to the recipient” and further clarify that “cost 
and benefit are defined on the basis of the lifetime direct fitness conse-
quences of a behavior”. Direct fitness is defined as “the component of 
fitness gained from producing offspring; [i.e.,] the component of person-
al fitness due to one’s own behavior” (p. 662).  
Natural selection operates on differences in reproductive fitness 
(i.e., relative reproductive success). Over the course of time, selection 
favors traits that increase fitness and eliminates traits that decrease 
fitness. Altruistic behavior reduces the fitness of the sender and in-
creases the fitness of the receiver; therefore, this behavior should be 
ruled out by natural selection (Trivers, 1971). 
One explanation for the evolution of altruism is Hamilton’s (1964) 
theory of inclusive fitness. Inclusive fitness transcends Darwin’s (1859) 
concept of classical fitness by accounting for the effect of an individual’s 
actions not only on personal reproductive success, but also on the re-
productive success of genetic relatives. Because genetic relatives share 
copies of genes (with the probability of gene sharing determined by the 
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degree of genetic relatedness), helping one’s kin might increase one’s 
inclusive fitness. The closer one is related to the recipient, the more one 
should be inclined to help. While classical fitness considers the perspec-
tive of a single individual, inclusive fitness reflects the perspective of a 
single gene (Dawkins, 1989; Hamilton, 1964; Williams, 1966). From the 
perspective of a single gene, it does not matter whether copies reside 
within one organism or another, as long as these genes are successfully 
passed on to future generations. Although inclusive fitness theory can 
be considered the single most important recent addition to the theory of 
natural selection (Buss, 2012), the explanatory power of this principle, 
regarding human altruism, is limited to a comparatively narrow range of 
helping behaviors, namely help among genetic relatives. However, in 
real-life, altruism is not confined to help among kin. People frequently 
bear costs to help individuals who are not relatives. 
Altruistic behavior among non-kin can be explained by the theory 
of reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971). Reciprocal altruism occurs when 
individuals cooperate for mutual benefit (Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992), i.e., 
when benefits bestowed upon non-relatives are reciprocated in the fu-
ture. The beauty of reciprocal altruism is that individuals help in times 
of abundance and receive aid in times of need. Thus, the benefits ex-
ceed the respective costs of helping (Trivers, 1971). However, reciprocal 
altruism only occurs within social relationships that allow for repeated 
interactions (Axelrod, & Hamilton, 1981). Similarly, according to the 
principle of reciprocal altruism, those whom we help must be both able 
and willing to reciprocate in the future. Human prosocial behavior fre-
quently violates these premises. For example, people often give change 
to beggars who they rarely encounter again and who they do not expect 
to reciprocate anything at any given time.  
How can evolutionary theories explain prosocial behavior that vio-
lates the premises of the inclusive fitness theory and the theory of recip-
rocal altruism? The basic idea underlying this thesis is that good deeds 
might evoke future benefits by signaling the qualities of an individual to 
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third parties, ultimately increasing his or her value as a partner in a 
biological market.  
1.2 Biological markets 
Humans populate biological markets. In a biological market, indi-
viduals compete for access to relationships with valuable partners who 
provide benefits relevant to reproductive fitness (Barclay, 2013; Noë, & 
Hammerstein, 1994, 1995). A particular subset of a biological market is 
the mating market, where men compete for sexual access to desirable 
women, and women compete for access to desirable men. The most de-
sirable women mate with the most desirable men and successfully re-
produce, whereas less desirable individuals must stick with other less 
desirable individuals or perish. However, mating is not the only domain 
governed by the laws of biological markets. In a biological market in the 
broadest sense, many “commodities” are traded and many “currencies” 
exist, e.g., protection, sexual access, and coalitional aid. In other words, 
whenever individuals are free to choose whom to interact with and 
whom to shun, and whenever one’s own reproductive success is contin-
gent upon the actions of others, biological markets emerge (Barclay, 
2013). Individuals differ in traits that render them better or worse part-
ners and thus determine their market value. To attract good partners, 
individuals must be considered good partners. However, this rationale 
does not imply that biological markets unite individuals possessing the 
same traits or looking for the same things. Rather, this idea implies that 
biological markets bring together individuals whose aggregated traits 
represent the same market value to each other (Barclay, 2013). A simple 
example from the mating market is that a very affluent but physically 
hideous man might succeed in attracting a very beautiful but desper-
ately poor woman, and vice versa. As for any market, biological markets 
adhere to the laws of supply and demand. 
A forerunner to the idea of biological markets is indirect reciprocity 
theory (Alexander, 1987; Nowak, & Sigmund, 1998, 2005). According to 
this theory, altruistic acts demonstrate the propensity of an individual 
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for doing good and contribute to the reputation of the focal individual as 
a benefactor. Third parties consider this reputation when identifying 
cooperation partners (Barclay, 2004). However, the concept of indirect 
reciprocity is much narrower than the concept of biological markets, as 
this principle implicitly states that cooperation will be rewarded with 
the future cooperation of third parties. In other words, cooperation is 
the only commodity in the model of indirect reciprocity, whereas in the 
model of biological markets, anything relevant to reproductive success 
can be a commodity, and the willingness and ability of an individual to 
provide these commodities determines their value as a partner (Barclay, 
2013). 
1.3 Signaling 
I argue that the propensity of an individual to perform good deeds 
is a valuable asset in a biological market because it might increase the 
market value of the individual as both an intimate and cooperative 
partner. 
However, before empirically extending this argument in Chapters 2 
to 4, one must first consider that individuals must identify partners 
possessing a propensity to perform good deeds. Signaling might be a 
solution to this problem. 
Just as the lavish and luminous plumage of the peacock signals 
superior health to peahens, good deeds might signal some underlying 
qualities of the individual, even (and arguably particularly) if these good 
deeds are directed towards third parties, i.e., if the observer of the sig-
nal does not directly benefit from the good deed. This idea has been 
formalized as the handicap principle or costly signaling (Gintis, Smith, & 
Bowles, 2001; Lotem, Fishman, & Stone, 2003; Zahavi, 1975, 1977 
1995; Zahavi, & Zahavi, 1996). Beyond signaling a good character to 
third parties (e.g., Barclay, 2004), altruistic and cooperative acts are 
assumed to reflect a wide range of underlying qualities, such as re-
source-holding potential, low mutation-load and even general intelli-
gence (Miller, 2000, 2007; Millet, & Dewitte, 2007). Advocates of the 
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costly signaling theory suggest that a signal must be particularly costly 
and hard-to-fake to serve as an honest signal for the underlying trait, 
i.e., that only individuals possessing the trait can “afford” the signal 
(e.g., Lotem et al., 2003; Zahavi, 1977; Zahavi, & Zahavi, 1996). 
However, if the object of study is limited to signals of morality, I ar-
gue that, in case of doubt, even small and minor deeds can be regarded 
as telltale signs of good or bad character, thereby affecting the market 
value of an individual. Even if selfish people might sometimes strategi-
cally fake signals of good character by doing good, the definition of self-
ishness requires that these instances will only occasionally occur. After 
all, if a selfish individual behaved selfless at all times (even if only for 
the purpose of falsely signaling selflessness), the individual could no 
longer be considered selfish. In short, as long as there is a higher prob-
ability of observing a good person performing a good deed than observ-
ing a bad person performing a good deed, these signals will affect trait 
inferences, particularly if other sources of acquiring information are 
limited. Indeed, as classic psychological research of the fundamental 
attribution error shows, humans attribute the isolated actions of others 
to the character of the individual rather than situational factors (Ross, 
1977). Heuristics such as these would likely not have evolved if they did 
not often lead to valid inferences (Gigerenzer, & Todd, 1999; Harvey, 
Town, & Yarkin, 1981).  
1.4 Overview of the empirical research 
Together with Olga Stavrova, Julia Pradel, Thomas Schlösser, and 
Detlef Fetchenhauer, I examined the effects of isolated acts of prosocial 
behavior as signals of good character across four studies. Two determi-
nants of the market value of an individual were considered: desirability 
as a mate (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) and desirability as a cooperative 
partner (Chapter 4). Specifically, we explored the conditions under 
which isolated prosocial acts lead to considerable gains in the desirabil-
ity as a mate or cooperative partner and the conditions under which 
such acts fail to have an effect.  
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On the one hand, these conditions might reflect the structure of 
demand within specific subsets of biological markets (Chapters 2 and 
3). According to sexual strategies theory (Buss, & Schmitt, 1993) and 
the theory of strategic pluralism (Gangestad, & Simpson, 2000), 
prosociality signals might differentially impact the market value of an 
individual as a short-term partner as compared to the market value as 
a long-term partner.  
On the other hand, there might be ambiguity due to different inter-
pretations regarding the traits underlying specific signals (Chapter 4). 
Depending on situational circumstances and the person of the observer, 
the same act might be construed in terms of different traits, e.g., moral-
ity and competence, leading to different representations of the market 
value of an individual as a cooperative partner. 
Doing good has many facets. In the present research, however, we 
concentrated on three classes of prosocial behavior: altruism (Chapter 
2), trustworthiness (Chapter 3), and trust (Chapter 4).  
In Chapter 2, we explored how signals of altruism shape percep-
tions of desirability in the short-term and long-term mate choices of fe-
males. According to the theory of strategic pluralism (Gangestad, & 
Simpson, 2000), most women possess distinct mate preferences allow-
ing them to identify short-term partners with good genes and long-term 
partners with adequate partner or parenting characteristics. We pre-
sented video clips of male targets possessing various levels of physical 
attractiveness and provided counterbalanced information on the behav-
ior of the targets in a one-shot dictator game. Female raters evaluated 
the targets with regard to the desirability as either short-term sexual or 
long-term romantic partners. Signals of altruism were more relevant for 
long-term rather than in short-term mate choices, whereas preferences 
for physical attractiveness were equally pronounced in both contexts. In 
addition, we observed that in long-term mating, displays of altruism 
had a larger effect on the desirability of physically attractive rather than 
unattractive targets.  
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Chapter 3 extended the scope of our first study by accounting for 
both female and male preferences and further substantiating the inter-
play between signals of morality and physical attractiveness. Based on 
sexual strategies theory (Buss, & Schmitt, 1993) and a cognitive per-
spective of preferential mate choice (Miller, & Todd, 1998), we experi-
mentally investigated the ways physical attractiveness and signals of 
moral virtue jointly shape perceptions of desirability in the long- and 
short-term mate choices of females and males. Silent video clips of tar-
get actors differing in physical attractiveness were presented to raters of 
the opposite sex who were provided with counterbalanced information 
regarding the decision of each target as a trustee in a one-shot binary 
trust game (previously validated as a suitable signal of moral virtue). 
The raters judged the desirability of the targets as either short-term 
sexual or long-term romantic partners. Physical attractiveness had a 
larger influence on desirability ratings in the short-term context, where-
as moral virtue was more important in the long-term context. The pref-
erences of males were more context-dependent, shifting more strongly 
towards physical attractiveness in the short-term context and moral vir-
tue in the long-term context than the preferences of females. In the 
long-term context, physical attractiveness and moral virtue were mutu-
ally reinforced regarding their effects on perceptions of desirability. 
In Chapter 4, we examined the influence of trustful behavior on the 
value of individuals as cooperation partners. In general, people prefer 
cooperation partners that possess both the willingness and the ability to 
cooperate (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). However, trust is a double-
edged sword; depending on the situation, trustful behavior might be 
perceived as self-interested or other-regarding, smart or gullible. Across 
two studies, noninvolved observers inferred personality traits from 
trustful versus distrustful behaviors in the context of a one-shot binary 
trust game. Considering the effects of social projection and consequen-
tialism, we observed that trustful behavior was almost universally per-
ceived more favorably than distrustful behavior with regard to funda-
mental dimensions of social judgment, namely warmth and competence, 
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and with regard to overall evaluations of personality. These findings 
support the notion that displays of trust might serve as social signals, 
demonstrating the qualities of an individual as a cooperative partner. 
A short integrative discussion of the empirical research presented 
in Chapters 2 to 4 is presented in Chapter 5, and future research is 
outlined in Chapter 6.  
1.5 Coauthors’ contributions 
Chapter 2 is based on a manuscript submitted to the British Jour-
nal of Social Psychology together with Julia Pradel, Olga Stavrova, and 
Detlef Fetchenhauer. Julia Pradel designed and conducted the study. 
Olga Stavrova assisted with the analysis and interpretation of the exper-
imental data and the preparation of the manuscript, particularly re-
garding the results section. Detlef Fetchenhauer provided advice on the 
experimental design and preparation of the manuscript.  
Chapter 3 is based on a manuscript submitted to Personal Rela-
tionships together with Olga Stavrova and Detlef Fetchenhauer. Olga 
Stavrova assisted in the analysis and interpretation of the experimental 
data and provided feedback on various drafts of the manuscript. Detlef 
Fetchenhauer provided advice regarding the design of the study and the 
preparation of the manuscript. 
Chapter 4 is based on a manuscript prepared for submission to the 
European Journal of Social Psychology together with Thomas Schlösser, 
Olga Stavrova, and Detlef Fetchenhauer. Thomas Schlösser provided 
advice concerning the design of both studies. Olga Stavrova assisted 
with the analysis of the data and interpretation of the results. Detlef 
Fetchenhauer provided advice on the experimental design and prepara-
tion of the manuscript.  
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2 Sexy or kind? Preferences for male physical attractiveness and 
altruism in females’ short-term and long-term mate choices 
2.1 Introduction 
Which traits do women seek in a man when they are looking for 
“Mr. Right”? In fairytales, “Mr. Right” is usually both handsome and vir-
tuous, like Prince Phillip in “Sleeping Beauty”, who overcame a forest of 
thorns and defeated the wicked fairy to awake beautiful Aurora with a 
kiss. Unfortunately, men like Prince Phillip are few and far between. 
Yet, in real life, living happily ever after is not the only type of possible 
relationship. Thus, women might find a man as kind (but most likely 
not as handsome) as Price Phillip for a committed long-term relation-
ship, while still occasionally having sex with a man as handsome (but 
most likely not as kind) as Prince Phillip. 
In the present study, we explore whether female preferences to-
ward physical attractiveness and altruism are subject to strategic plu-
ralism (Gangestad, & Simpson, 2000), i.e., whether female preferences 
for physical attractiveness are more relevant in short-term than in long-
term mate choices, whereas preferences for altruism are more pro-
nounced in long-term than in short-term mate choices. However, why 
may such a shift in preferences occur? 
2.1.1 The benefits of strategic pluralism 
The theory of parental investment (Trivers, 1972) postulates that 
women invest more time and effort into their offspring and should thus 
be choosier than men in regard to mate selection. Because women are 
more limited than men in their hypothetical maximum number of off-
spring, they typically cannot increase their reproductive success by hav-
ing a large number of mates. Hence, women should place a high value 
on the quality (rather than the quantity) of their potential mates, both in 
terms of genetic endowment and in terms of qualities as a good partner 
or loving parent for future offspring. Still, a popular notion says that 
“you can’t always get what you want”, and very few women will be able 
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to attract a partner who is endowed with both good genes and good 
partner or parenting characteristics. According to the theory of strategic 
pluralism (Gangestad, & Simpson, 2000), women may consider obtain-
ing these different qualities from different partners, i.e., looking for good 
genes in short-term sexual partners and looking for good parenting or 
partner characteristics in long-term mates. On the other hand, accord-
ing to Gangestad and Simpson (2000), men should react to female pref-
erences by specializing in one particular mating strategy: those en-
dowed with superior genes (and thus appearance) could benefit from 
specializing in short-term mating. It has been shown that facial and 
bodily attractiveness in males is correlated with an increased number of 
short-term, but not long-term, sexual partners and with an earlier onset 
of sexual activity (Rhodes, Simmons, & Peters, 2005). Furthermore, 
Simpson and Gangestad (1991) showed that unrestricted sociosexuality 
in men is correlated negatively with markers of relationship quality, 
such as commitment to the current partner, investment in the ongoing 
relationship and love for and psychological and emotional dependency 
on the current partner. On the other hand, according to Gangestad and 
Simpson (2000), men who cannot signal their genetic qualities through 
physical attractiveness could compensate for this weakness by demon-
strating their qualities as a good long-term partner or parent and 
should therefore specialize in long-term mating. Indeed, it has been 
shown that fluctuating asymmetry (with symmetry being a marker of 
good genes) is negatively correlated with lifetime number of sexual part-
ners in males (Gangestad, & Thornhill, 1997) and that sexually restrict-
ed men tend to present themselves as “nice guys” in intrasexual compe-
tition, while unrestricted men are more likely to use direct competition 
tactics, such as asserting superiority over prospective rivals (Simpson, 
Gangestad, Christensen, & Leck, 1999). 
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2.1.2 Which traits do women desire in short-term and long-term 
partners? 
Temporal shifts in females’ mate preferences rarely manifest in 
such a way that male traits that are desirable in long-term mating sud-
denly become undesirable in short-term mating, or vice versa. Rather, 
one can observe a considerable shift concerning the “necessities” versus 
“luxuries” regarding the most desirable traits in a long-term or short-
term partner (Buss, & Schmitt, 1993; Li, Bailey, Kenrick, & Linsemeier, 
2002; Li, & Kenrick, 2006; Regan, Levin, Sprecher, Christopher, & Cate, 
2000). Short-term mating preferences should be especially tuned to 
finding a mate with good genes, while long-term mating preferences 
should be aimed at identifying a mate who would be a caring spouse or 
loving father to future offspring (Gangestad, & Simpson, 2000). 
Attractive male physical features, such as facial and bodily sym-
metry or masculinity, are considered to be cues of good health and thus 
superior genetic quality (e.g., Gangestad, & Thornhill, 1997; Rhodes, 
2006). Gangestad and Thornhill (1997) provided compelling evidence 
that women seek out physically attractive men, especially as short-term 
partners. This claim is backed by a growing body of research highlight-
ing the influence of the female menstrual cycle (and thus fertility) on 
preferences for male physical attractiveness (e.g., Gangestad, & 
Thornhill, 2008; Gangestad, Thornhill, & Garver-Apgar, 2005). During 
estrus, i.e., when the probability of conception is the highest, women 
preferentially seek men who possess markers of good genes, such as 
symmetrical features and masculinity. In particular, women with less 
sexually attractive long-term partners exhibited a stronger desire for sex 
with attractive males outside their relationship around ovulation 
(Pillsworth, & Haselton, 2006). 
A multitude of studies across several cultures have shown that 
many moral traits related to altruism, such as kindness, honesty or 
warmth, are universally said to be attractive in a mate (e.g., Barclay, 
2010, Buss, 1989a; Phillips, Barnard, Ferguson, & Reader, 2008; Regan 
et al, 2000). Yet, identifying a truly altruistic man is not trivial because 
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seemingly altruistic behavior will often be nothing but mere mating ef-
forts (e.g., invitations to dinner, flowers, or presents). Therefore, the 
scope of our research will be limited to altruism directed toward third 
parties (e.g., donations to charity or homeless persons) in which the 
woman does not benefit directly herself but might still draw inferences 
about a man’s character. 
To the best of our knowledge, until now, there have been very few 
studies aimed at the attractiveness of altruism directed at third parties 
considering differential preferences in short-term and long-term mating 
as predicted by the theory of strategic pluralism. 
Barclay (2010) examined the desirability of altruism in short-term 
and long-term mate choices using simulated dating advertisements that 
contained pictures and short descriptions of target persons, which ei-
ther indicated altruistic tendencies or were lacking such cues. For each 
sex, four different but equally attractive pictures were used and coun-
terbalanced across the conditions. It became apparent that across both 
sexes, altruists were rated to be more desirable than neutrally described 
individuals for long-term relationships. For one-night stands, on the 
other hand, women did not significantly prefer altruists over neutrally 
described individuals, while men even preferred neutrally described 
women over altruistic women. 
Furthermore, Farrelly (2011) investigated preferences for altruism 
in females’ short-term and long-term mate choices in a series of four 
experiments. In three out of the four experiments, Farrelly employed 
written descriptions of target persons containing or not containing cues 
about altruistic character traits or altruistic behavior (similar to Bar-
clay, 2010). In the fourth experiment, several specific actions related to 
altruism (e.g., regularly donating blood) were rated concerning their de-
sirability in a short-term or long-term mate. Farelly did not include any 
pictures or videos of the target persons. The results indicated that 
women tended to favor signs of altruism primarily in long-term relation-
ships. Additionally, contrary to studies highlighting the influence of 
menstrual cycle stage on mate preferences for markers of good genes, 
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Farrelly did not find any noteworthy relationship between female cycle 
stage and preferences for altruism in males, indicating that altruism 
was likely not perceived as a signal of genetic quality. 
Barclay (2010) and Farelly (2011) provided information on prospec-
tive short-term or long-term partners’ altruism by employing experi-
mental vignettes containing fictionalized dating profiles, which allowed 
them to state that altruism was more important in long-term than in 
short-term mate choices. Although these findings are in line with the 
theory of strategic pluralism, the aforementioned studies can only con-
firm one part of Gangestad and Simpson’s theory, namely, that women 
attach more importance to displays of altruism in long-term mating 
than they do in short-term mating. Likewise, it has been shown that 
women exhibit stronger preferences for markers of good genes in short-
term than in long-term mate choice (e.g., Gangestad, & Thornhill, 
1997), which provides support for the other part of the theory of strate-
gic pluralism. Still, to the best of our knowledge, there have been no 
studies concurrently testing both parts of the theory until now. Thus, to 
obtain a more comprehensive and holistic perspective of strategic plu-
ralism, we decided to examine the relevance of markers of good genes 
(i.e., physical attractiveness) and markers of good partner or parenting 
qualities (i.e., altruism) in short-term and long-term mate choices at the 
same time. 
In summary, it can be stated that a multitude of studies have indi-
cated that male physical attractiveness is a marker of good genes and 
should thus be particularly relevant in short-term mating (e.g., 
Gangestad, & Thornhill, 1997; Rhodes, 2006). Additionally, there is pre-
liminary evidence suggesting that altruism should predominantly be a 
marker of good partner or parenting qualities and should thus be more 
important in long-term mating (Barclay, 2010; Farrelly, 2011). Thus, in 
accordance with the theory of strategic pluralism and existing empirical 
data, we have derived the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Women prefer physically attractive men over less 
physically attractive men. 
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Hypothesis 2: In females’ short-term mate choices, preferences for 
physical attractiveness are more pronounced than in long-term choices.  
Hypothesis 3: Women prefer altruistic men over egoistic men. 
Hypothesis 4: In females’ long-term mate choices, preferences for 
altruism are more pronounced than in short-term choices. 
2.1.3 The current study 
To test these hypotheses, we devised a video-aided rating proce-
dure that allowed us to simultaneously and independently manipulate 
information on both physical attractiveness and altruism. 
Unlike Barclay (2010), who provided pictures of equally attractive 
individuals (possibly to render the dating advertisements more realistic 
and credible), and Farrelly (2011), who provided only written descrip-
tions of target persons and no pictures or videos at all, we decided to 
present a broad sample of various men with substantially different lev-
els of physical attractiveness in either short-term or long-term mating 
contexts. 
Furthermore, instead of using fictionalized personality profiles con-
taining rather mundane displays of altruism, such as volunteer work or 
donations to charity (Barclay, 2010; Farrelly, 2011), we decided to pro-
vide information on targets’ decisions in a one-shot anonymous dictator 
game. In experimental psychology and economics, the dictator game, 
first employed by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1987), has been es-
tablished as a standard procedure for measuring altruism (and egoism) 
on a behavioral level (e.g., Eckel, & Grossman, 1996; Forsythe, Horo-
witz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996). En-
dowed with a certain amount of money provided by the experimenter, 
the dictator has to decide how much of this endowment he or she wish-
es to pass on to an anonymous receiver in a one-shot interaction. The 
receiver is bound to accept the dictator’s decision, which eliminates any 
strategic concern on the part of the dictator. Giving in dictator game 
experiments appears to be positively related to trait agreeableness in 
the Big-Five model and the honesty-humility dimension in the 
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HEXACO-model of personality (Ben-Ner, Kong, & Putterman, 2004; 
Ben-Ner, Kramer, & Levy, 2008; Ben-Ner, Putterman, Kong, & Magan, 
2004; Hilbig, & Zettler, 2009). Likewise, generosity in the dictator game 
has been associated with the personality disposition of justice sensitivi-
ty. Specifically, people who are sensitive to observing that others are 
treated unfairly and people who are sensitive to profiting from unfair 
situations have been shown to allocate larger proportions of their initial 
endowments to receivers in the dictator game (Fetchenhauer, & Xu, 
2004). Furthermore, Benz and Meier (2008) demonstrated in two exper-
iments that charitable giving in experimental settings was positively 
correlated with charitable giving in field settings before and after the 
respective experiments. By providing information on targets’ behavior in 
such a dictator game, we were thus able to systematically and authenti-
cally manipulate information on targets’ altruism, yet avoid making up 
specific personality profiles, which may inadvertently differ in other di-
mensions than the one we intended to manipulate. 
Providing counterbalanced information on physical attractiveness 
and on altruism allowed us to test multiple predictions concerning fe-
male preferences for attractiveness and for altruism in short-term and 
long-term mate choices at the same time. 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Stimulus material and ratings of physical attractiveness 
A total of 77 male students from a large Dutch university were vid-
eotaped sitting in front of a white wall while introducing themselves. 
The videos were cut into silent 20-second clips with a ten-second transi-
tion in which the identification number of the upcoming video was dis-
played. On the basis of these clips, 25 female judges with a mean age of 
23.60 years (SD = 2.75) from a German university rated the physical 
attractiveness of male targets on a seven-point Likert-type scale ranging 
from “not attractive at all” to “very attractive”. Because the ratings 
reached adequate inter-rater reliability (ICC = .95), averaged ratings 
could be used as indicators of physical attractiveness in the analysis. 
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2.2.2 Participants and procedure 
Participants were 75 female students from a German university 
with a mean age of 22.61 years (SD = 3.42), who were approached on 
campus and agreed to participate on a prescheduled date. The experi-
ment was conducted in a medium-sized lecture hall with separate runs 
for several groups of raters. Participants were seated facing the projec-
tion surface with an appropriate distance between one another. 
All relevant information (except for the video clips) was provided in 
written form to each participant via questionnaire. First, all participants 
read the description of an anonymous one-shot binary dictator game. 
The dictator was said to be endowed with €10 by the experimenter and 
confronted with the decision of whether to split the money equally and 
send €5 to an anonymous receiver or to keep the whole €10 while send-
ing nothing to the receiver. After filling out a set of control questions 
concerning potential monetary outcomes of the interaction for both par-
ties, participants were informed that they would rate the desirability of 
male target persons who had taken part in the dictator game described 
above and who would be presented on the screen. 
Half of the participants were asked to rate the target persons’ de-
sirability as short-term sexual partners (i.e., “for a short-term sexual 
affair, where sexuality is in the foreground for both partners and where 
feelings don’t play a role”). The other half were asked to rate the target 
persons’ desirability as long-term romantic partners (i.e., “for a long-
term relationship, where both partners are faithful and highly emotion-
ally connected to each other, and where both partners invest heavily in 
a permanent relationship”). Additionally, for each target person, partici-
pants were provided with information on the target’s decision in the dic-
tator game outlined above. The information about the target persons’ 
behavior was presented in a randomized way, with one half of the par-
ticipants being informed that a given target person had split the money 
and one half of the participants being informed that the same target 
person had kept the money. To control for position effects, videos were 
shown in a different order for each run, with the first video in the for-
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ward order being the last video in the backward order, and vice versa. 
Because the order of presentation did not yield any effects on desirabil-
ity ratings (F (1,72) = .36, p = .55), this factor was not further consid-
ered in the subsequent analysis. 
The written descriptions of the target persons’ behavior in the dic-
tator game were matched with the corresponding video clips using iden-
tification numbers, which were announced on screen prior to each clip. 
Thereby, participants were able to integrate their perceptions of the tar-
gets’ physical attractiveness and behavior in the dictator game accord-
ingly and to develop an overall desirability rating. All desirability ratings 
were captured on seven-point Likert-type scales ranging from “not de-
sirable at all” to “very desirable”. 
To summarize, 77 stimuli (target persons) with various levels of 
physical attractiveness were randomly presented either as altruists or 
as egoists and were rated on the dimension of desirability as either 
short-term or long-term partners, resulting in two between-subjects fac-
tors (mating context: short-term vs. long-term; dictator game behavior: 
egoistic vs. altruistic) for a given stimulus. After completion of the video-
based rating procedure, participants answered some questions concern-
ing their basic socio-demographic data and were then thanked for their 
participation and dismissed. 
2.3 Results 
To account for the fact that information about stimuli’s behavior in 
a dictator game and mating context varied randomly within stimuli and 
between participants, we estimated a mixed regression model, which 
treated both participants and stimuli as random effects (Judd, Westfall, 
& Kenny, 2012). The unit of analysis was a participant by stimulus ob-
servation, with each row of data representing the general desirability 
rating given by a participant on a specific stimulus (dependent variable). 
Stimulus’ altruism (egoistic vs. altruistic), z-standardized physical at-
tractiveness score (as provided by exogenous raters), and respective 
mating context (short-term vs. long-term) served as independent varia-
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bles. The estimated model included three fixed effects (altruism, mating 
context and physical attractiveness) and three two-way (altruism x mat-
ing context, altruism x physical attractiveness, physical attractiveness x 
mating context) and one three-way (altruism x mating context x physi-
cal attractiveness) interactions, as well as three random error compo-
nents: variation in the intercept due to stimuli and due to participants 
and random error variation at the level of participant by stimuli obser-
vation. 
The analysis of the random components of the model indicated a 
significant variability of desirability ratings across stimuli (Wald Z = 
5.20, p < .001) and across participants (Wald Z = 5.77, p < .001), mean-
ing that targets’ desirability ratings varied significantly across partici-
pants and targets. 
Before starting to the test our hypotheses in chronological order, 
we first examined the effect of mating context on ratings of desirability. 
The temporal context of mate choice (i.e., short-term vs. long-term) 
showed no significant effect on overall desirability ratings (F (1, 73) = 
1.36, p = .25), indicating that, on average, desirability ratings were no 
more or less generous in short-term than in long-term mating. 
In the following, we systematically tested our hypotheses concern-
ing the relevance of attractiveness and altruism in females’ short-term 
and long-term mate choices (see Table 1). 
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Table 1: Mixed regression model with desirability ratings as the de-
pendent variable 
 F p 
Fixed effects   
Altruism 160.67*** < .001 
Physical attractiveness 385.84*** < .001 
Mating context 1.37 .25 
Altruism x physical attractiveness 19.32*** < .001 
Altruism x mating context 35.84*** < .001 
Physical attractiveness x mating context 0.30 .58 
Altruism x physical attractiveness  
       x mating context 
6.89** .009 
Random effects   
Variance due to participant .15*** .03 
Variance due to stimuli .04*** .01 
Error variance .54*** .01 
-2 Log Likelihood 13,269.33 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
Hypothesis 1 stated that women would prefer physically attractive 
over physically unattractive men. As anticipated, physical attractiveness 
had an overall positive impact on ratings of desirability (F (1, 74) = 
384.64, p < .001). 
Hypothesis 2 stated that female preferences for physical attractive-
ness would be more pronounced in short-term than in long-term mate 
choices. However, there was no significant interaction between mating 
context and physical attractiveness (F (1, 5613) = .30, p = .58), indicat-
ing that preferences for male physical attractiveness were equally pro-
nounced in short-term as in long-term mate choices. 
Hypothesis 3 stated that women would prefer altruistic over egois-
tic men. As predicted, displays of altruism (as indicated by dictator 
game behavior) showed a considerable effect on desirability ratings (F 
(1, 5615) = 157.52, p < .001), meaning that, on average, altruistic tar-
gets were judged to be significantly more desirable (M = 2.27, SD = 0.08) 
than egoistic targets (M = 1.92, SD = 0.08). 
Hypothesis 4 stated that female preferences for altruism would be 
more pronounced in long-term than in short-term mate choices. Indeed, 
there was a significant interaction between altruism and mating context 
(F (1, 5617) = 35.93, p < .001). A simple effect analysis showed that al-
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truistic behavior played a more important role in overall male desirabil-
ity as long-term (b = .36, p < .001) than as short-term partners (b = .13, 
p < .001). As long-term partners, altruistic targets (M = 2.43, SD = 0.10) 
were considered significantly more desirable than egoistic targets (M = 
1.91, SD = 0.10, mean difference .52, p < .001), whereas, in short-term 
partners, the effect of altruistic behavior shrank considerably but did 
not disappear completely (M = 2.11, SD = 0.10 vs. M = 1.92, SD = 0.10, 
mean difference .19, p < .001). 
Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between dictator 
game behavior and physical attractiveness (F (1, 5621) = 19.31, p < 
.001), which was further accentuated by a significant three-way interac-
tion between dictator game behavior, physical attractiveness and mat-
ing context (F (1, 5623) = 6.89, p < .01). This means that, in long-term 
mating, the impact of dictator game behavior on ratings of desirability 
was dependent on the physical attractiveness of the target. Namely, in 
the context of long-term mating, the impact of altruistic behavior on rat-
ings of desirability was higher for attractive than for unattractive targets 
(baltruism*attractiveness = .14, p < .001), whereas in a short-term mating con-
text, the effect of altruism was equally strong for attractive as for unat-
tractive targets (baltruism*attractiveness = .03, p = .21). 
Figure 1 shows the estimated overall desirability scores for long-
term and short-term partners for physically attractive (one standard de-
viation above the mean) and physically unattractive (one standard devi-
ation below the mean) targets described as either altruists or egoists. 
The findings indicate that, in a short-term mating context, both altru-
ism and physical attractiveness influence desirability ratings (with al-
truism being considerably less important than it is in long-term mat-
ing). However, in the context of long-term mating, the impact of altru-
ism on desirability ratings was not only stronger than in short-term 
mating but was also more pronounced among physically attractive tar-
gets. 
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Figure 1: Short-term and long-term desirability ratings (z-
standardized) of physically attractive (one standard deviation above 
the mean) and physically unattractive (one standard deviation be-
low the mean) male targets who were described either as altruists 
or as egoists 
 
2.4 Discussion 
This analysis has provided us with a multitude of results concern-
ing female preferences for physical attractiveness and displays of altru-
ism in short-term and long-term mate choices, which were partly antic-
ipated but which also require additional reflection on a theoretical level. 
Across all conditions, physical attractiveness had a substantial ef-
fect on desirability ratings, which agrees with our first hypothesis. How-
ever, contrary to our second hypothesis, male physical attractiveness 
was equally important in short-term as it was in long-term female mate 
choices. Still, this finding does not contradict previous studies indicat-
ing the importance of physical attractiveness as a marker of good genes 
(e.g., Gangestad, & Thornhill, 1997). Rather, it shows that good genes 
seem to be equally desirable in long-term mates as they are in short-
term mates, as long as no constraints on the realizability of these pref-
erences are introduced. In fact, our experimental design did not involve 
any type of forced choice between different potential partners who were 
either physically attractive or kind but captured ratings of overall desir-
ability per se. Whether the high standards concerning physical attrac-
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tiveness we observed in our experiment can be actually met in real-life 
female mate choices thus remains to be answered. In regard to actually 
finding a long-term partner and making a decision rather than making 
a wish, preferences for physical attractiveness may fade into the back-
ground. Across a series of studies Li et al. (2002) provided women with 
the opportunity to “build” ideal long-term partners by allocating a given 
budget to several characteristics including status and resources, kind-
ness, intelligence, and physical attractiveness. Especially when the 
budget was low rather than high, women were willing to settle for con-
siderably lower levels of physical attractiveness, while prioritizing sta-
tus, resources, kindness, and intelligence. However, when constructing 
ideal short-term partners, women were likely to prioritize physical at-
tractiveness (Li, & Kenrick, 2006). 
On a related note, one must also consider the young age of our 
student sample. On the one hand, young adults are a fairly good start-
ing point for investigating mate choice criteria because adaptive prob-
lems of mate choices and reproduction should be most relevant in early 
adulthood. On the other hand, the mean age at first marriage is 30.30 
years for women, and the mean age at the birth of a first child is 28.90 
years in Germany (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 
2010), which is considerably older than the mean age of our sample 
(22.61 years). Therefore, finding a partner for life or a father for future 
offspring may be a task that is often postponed until the late 20s or 
even early 30s in a modern postindustrial society, especially among 
university graduates. Thus, the adaptive problems of finding a reliable 
long-term partner and father for future offspring may not have been a 
central concern in the lives of some of the young women in our student 
sample. It is also possible that only few of these women have ever actu-
ally had to face the insight that “you can’t always get what you want”. 
In accordance with our third hypothesis, women preferred altruis-
tic men over egoistic men. This preference was present even in short-
term mating, which could partly be due to a strong fear of sexual ag-
gression in females. In a study by Buss (1989b), women rated sexual 
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aggression to be by far the most upsetting of 147 potentially upsetting 
male behaviors (such as nonsexual physical abuse). Because propensity 
for sexual aggression seems to be connected to criminal and antisocial 
behavior in other domains (Lalumière, Harris, Quinsey, & Rice, 2005), 
women may direct their attention to even the slightest cues of a man’s 
good (or bad) character, even in short-term mate choices. Likewise, 
women may sometimes engage in short-term mating to assess men as 
prospective long-term partners (Buss, & Schmitt, 1993) and frequently 
believe that a sexual relationship may lead to a long-term romantic rela-
tionship (Li, & Kenrick, 2006). Therefore, some of the criteria relevant to 
long-term mating may be applied to the choice of short-term mates as 
well. 
However, in line with our fourth hypothesis, displays of altruism 
made a notably larger impact on desirability ratings in long-term than 
in short-term mate choices. This not only agrees with previous results 
by Barclay (2010) and Farrelly (2011) but also extends the findings be-
cause the proxy for altruism we employed was rather subtle and provid-
ed specific behavioral information on a decision in a one-shot, low-
stakes laboratory game. Furthermore, our manipulation of altruism had 
to “compete” against very vivid, graphic and diversified information on 
physical attractiveness (i.e., video clips). We therefore assume this to be 
a rather conservative test regarding the relevance of altruism in short-
term and long-term female mate choices. Our results clearly support 
the hypothesis that preferences for altruism are more relevant in long-
term than in short-term mate choices, which is in accordance with the 
theory of strategic pluralism (Gangestad, & Simpson, 2000). 
Finally, we have found that, in long-term mating, displays of altru-
ism made a larger impact on the desirability of physically attractive 
than unattractive men. This result can be interpreted in various ways: 
in the light of what we just learned concerning the equal desirability of 
physical attractiveness in short-term and long-term mating, one might 
suggest that a lack of physical attractiveness would be a “no go”, even 
in long-term mating, i.e., that a man who is physically unattractive can 
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hardly compensate for that by being nice. Second, and on a different 
note, one might argue that physically attractive men as carriers of good 
genes are a scarce resource and thus attract more female attention, 
rendering their behavioral displays more salient. Across a series of five 
studies, Maner et al. (2003) showed that both men and women selec-
tively direct their attention towards attractive members of the opposite 
sex. Likewise, it has been shown that even very young infants gaze 
longer at more attractive adult faces and played more extensively with 
facially attractive dolls than with facially unattractive dolls (Langlois, 
Roggman, & Rieser-Danner, 1990). However, a potential premium of 
attention does not necessarily help more than it hurts: in terms of mate 
attraction, handsome men may not only receive more praise for their 
good deeds, they might also be condemned more severely for behaving 
wrongfully. According to the so-called “what is beautiful is good” heuris-
tic (Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972), physically attractive targets 
might have been given a “beauty premium” in advance, with good looks 
being (mis)taken as a sign of good character. Behaving egoistically, i.e., 
contrary to raters’ high expectations, may result in disappointment and 
therefore lead to significantly lower ratings of desirability. This would be 
in line with previous research by Wilson and Eckel (2006), who showed 
that attractive trustors in a trust game were likely to undergo a “beauty 
penalty” if they failed to fulfill the trustees’ high expectations. Future 
research needs to address the question of whether attractive individuals 
benefit more from behaving altruistically or whether they are con-
demned more harshly for behaving egoistically than less attractive indi-
viduals. 
Concerning the generalizability of the results obtained in the cur-
rent study, we must consider several limitations. First, with women be-
ing the more selective sex (Trivers, 1972), we decided to account for only 
females’ mate choices, not males’ mate choices. However, it might be 
interesting to replicate this study using a sample comprising both males 
and females. Men are said to specialize either in short-term or in long-
term mating, depending on their own physical attractiveness, whereas 
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women are likely to follow both strategies at once (Gangestad, & Simp-
son, 2000; Gangestad, & Thornhill, 1997; Rhodes, Simmons, & Peters, 
2005). Therefore, attributes such as fluctuating asymmetry or mascu-
linity in male raters may be a relevant predictor for which strategy they 
prefer and for what they look for in female targets. Additionally, while 
our results showed that women found displays of altruism to be attrac-
tive even in prospective short-term mates, men may shy away from 
prosocial women when looking for a sexual affair. In fact, agreeableness 
and conscientiousness have been shown to be correlated negatively with 
interest in short-term mating and an unrestricted sociosexual orienta-
tion (Schmitt, & Shackelford, 2008) but positively with altruistic behav-
ior in anonymous dictator games (Ben-Ner et al., 2004). Therefore, men 
may (implicitly) assume that altruistic women are “hard to get”. 
Second, as stated above, rating a variety of targets concerning their 
desirability as either short-term or long-term partners does not (in most 
cases) reflect the dynamics of real-life mate choices  because partici-
pants did not have to trade off one desired trait against another, yet we 
insist that this procedure is a thoroughly conservative test of our hy-
potheses. If altruism is more relevant in long-term than in short-term 
mate choices, even when there is no need to decide, this effect will be all 
the more pronounced when a trade-off is required. Therefore, we believe 
that our results provide strong empirical support for the theory of stra-
tegic pluralism (Gangestad, & Simpson, 2000). 
The current study can contribute to the debate on the evolution of 
human altruism, which is largely still a puzzle (Batson, 1991; Fehr, & 
Fischbacher, 2003; Lehmann, & Keller, 2006). By definition, altruism is 
costly to the sender while granting benefits to the receiver (Trivers, 
1971) and should therefore be ruled out by natural selection (Trivers, 
1971). Following Miller (2000, 2007), we argue that the evolution of 
human altruism could be explained by sexual selection theory, with al-
truism as a trait that is capable of promoting one’s desirability as an 
intimate partner. This does not imply that sexual selection is the only 
evolutionary source of altruism. Actually, other contemporary theories, 
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such as kin selection (Hamilton, 1964), direct reciprocity (Axelrod, 
1981; Trivers, 1971), indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; for a review 
see Leimar, & Hammerstein, 2001; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005), strong 
reciprocity (Gintis, 2000) or multilevel selection (Wilson, 1997), provide 
compelling answers to the question of how altruism could have evolved. 
Yet, as Miller (2007, p. 98) notes, sexual selection might have served as 
a catalyst for the evolution of altruism, “‘supercharging’ other evolu-
tionary processes by adding positive feedback dynamics” in terms of de-
sirability as a mate. The theory of strategic pluralism suggests that the-
se positive feedback dynamics may be context-dependent to some ex-
tent, hence allowing for considerable interindividual and situational var-
iation both in preferences for altruism and in displays of altruism. Be-
having altruistically may produce noteworthy gains in terms of desira-
bility as a mate but primarily only in long-term mate choices. When 
looking for a short-term sexual affair, being nice may just not be 
worthwhile, especially if one is already handsome. 
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3 How physical attractiveness and moral virtue shape perceptions 
of short- and long-term desirability 
3.1 Introduction 
Previous research of mate preferences has predominantly focused 
on exploring the characteristics women and men desire in their long-
term romantic and short-term sexual partners, the ways these prefer-
ences for certain traits are prioritized with regard to sex and different 
mating contexts, and the conditions under which one desirable trait will 
be favored over another (for an overview see Buss, 2012). 
However, mate choice usually does not entail making a wish list of 
desirable attributes in a partner, nor does it involve choosing from a set 
of known alternatives (Miller, & Todd, 1998). Rather, we meet different 
people in our day-to-day lives in various contexts: maybe at a party, at 
work, or even online. These people differ in various characteristics, 
which we may find more or less desirable in a mate. Few individuals are 
perfect in every way; most possess some positive and some negative at-
tributes. Of the people we meet or interact with, some are people we 
would like to spend our lives with, others we would like to spend a night 
with, and some we prefer not to consider for either. However, how do we 
arrive at these judgments? Surprisingly, few researchers have ad-
dressed the question regarding the ways in which cues of different de-
sirable (or undesirable) traits are integrated and jointly shape percep-
tions of the overall desirability of others in short- and long-term mating. 
In the current study, we focus on physical attractiveness and dis-
plays of moral virtue. We experimentally manipulated these traits to ex-
amine the ways they contribute to perceptions of desirability in either a 
short- or long-term mating context. Drawing from sexual strategies the-
ory (Buss, & Schmitt, 1993) and a cognitive perspective of mate choice 
(Miller, & Todd, 1998), we explored the extent to which these two factors 
influence desirability in short- and long-term mate choice, the ways fe-
males and males adjust their selection criteria depending on the given 
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mating context, and the ways cues of physical attractiveness and moral 
virtue are integrated to arrive at overall judgments of desirability. 
3.1.1 Parental investment and sexual strategies theory 
According to the theory of parental investment (Trivers, 1972), the 
sex that invests fewer time and resources in offspring will be more com-
petitive than the other sex, and the sex that invests more will be more 
selective than the other sex. As in all other mammal species, among 
humans, the hypothetical minimal obligatory investment in offspring is 
considerably higher for females than for males. Therefore, according to 
numerous studies, women generally are more selective concerning the 
quality of prospective mates, and men are generally more competitive for 
sexual access to a large quantity of partners (e.g., Clark, & Hatfield, 
1989; Ronay, & von Hippel, 2010; Schützewohl, Fuchs, McKibben, & 
Shackelford, 2009; Surbey, & Conohan, 2000; Wilson, & Daly, 1985). 
Nevertheless, most men typically invest substantially more time and 
resources in offspring than the minimal investment necessary (Geary, 
2000; Geary, & Flinn, 2001; Geary, Vigil, & Byrd-Craven, 2004). Thus, 
human mating is usually characterized by mutual mate choice; i.e., 
both women and men are selective regarding desirable characteristics of 
their potential partners and compete for access to the most desirable 
members of the opposite sex (Buss, 1989a, Buss et al., 1990; Geary, 
Vigil, & Byrd-Craven, 2004; Regan, Levin, Sprecher, Christopher, & 
Cate, 2000). 
Sexual strategies theory (Buss, & Schmitt, 1993) extends Trivers’ 
(1972) theory of parental investment by considering that preferences in 
females’ and males’ mate choices are not only contingent on sex, but 
also on the temporal context of mating. Most women and men are as-
sumed to be equipped with distinct reproductive strategies for short-
term (e.g., a one-night stand or extramarital affair) and long-term (e.g., 
a committed relationship or marriage) mating contexts, which include 
distinct adaptive preferences concerning the qualities of potential short-
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term and long-term partners (Buss, 1998; Buss, & Schmitt, 1993; 
Gangestad, & Simpson, 2000; Regan et al., 2000). 
3.1.2 Adaptive problems and preferences in short-term and long-
term mating 
3.1.2.1 Short-term mate choice 
In their short-term mate choices, men are only slightly selective, 
and attend mainly to signals of fertility, health, and sexual accessibility. 
Women, on the other hand, are more selective than men and focus pre-
dominantly on indicators of health and good genes (Buss, 2012; Buss, 
& Schmitt, 1993; Geary, Vigil, & Byrd-Craven, 2004). In simplified 
terms, markers of health and fertility in females and health and good 
genes in males are perceived as physical attractiveness (e.g., Fink, & 
Penton-Voak, 2002; Gangestad, & Scheyd, 2005; Grammer, & 
Thornhill, 1994; Kościński, 2008; Little, Jones, & DeBruine, 2011; 
Rhodes, 2006). Standards of physical attractiveness emerge early in life 
(Langlois, Roggman, & Reiser-Danner, 1990) and are largely consistent 
across races and cultures (Cunningham, Roberts, Wu, Barbee, & 
Druen, 1995; Jones, & Hill, 1993; for a review see, Langlois, Kalakanis, 
Rubenstein, Larson, Hallam, & Smoot, 2000). Because illustrating the 
determinants of physical attractiveness and their relationship to fertili-
ty, health and genetic fitness would exceed the scope of this article, we 
confined ourselves to considering physical attractiveness as a generally 
reliable proxy for all fitness-relevant physical attributes of a person. 
Hence, in short-term mating, women and men are expected to be espe-
cially attentive to potential partners’ physical attractiveness. 
3.1.2.2 Long-term mate choice 
Health, fertility, and good genes are expected to be valuable in a 
long-term mate, as is the case in the choice of short-term mates. There-
fore, females and males likely prefer attractive to less attractive long-
term term partners, just as they prefer attractive to less attractive 
short-term partners. However, strong preferences for potential partners’ 
moral virtue are expected as well. Women are expected to prefer morally 
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virtuous men because ancestral women required dependable, trustwor-
thy and kindhearted partners who were willing to invest substantial 
time and resources for an extended period of time. Likewise, ancestral 
men needed to identify faithful and dependable women who would not 
engage in extramarital affairs with other men. In terms of evolutionary 
fitness, unwittingly investing time and resources in another man’s off-
spring would be considered the worst-case scenario. Quasi-moral traits 
such as dependability, kindness, and altruism, as well as behaviors 
that indicate whether such traits are present, are universally highly 
valued in long-term mates (e.g., Barclay, 2010; Buss et al., 1990; 
Farrelly, 2011; Farrelly, Lazarus, & Roberts, 2007; Kelly, & Dunbar, 
2001; Phillips, Barnard, Ferguson, & Reader, 2008). Therefore, in long-
term mating, both women and men are expected to be especially atten-
tive to behavioral displays that may indicate the presence or absence of 
moral traits such as trustworthiness, dependability, or kindness (Buss, 
& Schmitt, 1993; Gangestad, & Simpson, 2000). 
3.1.3 Testing preferences across different mating contexts 
Numerous previous studies of mate preferences used explicit rat-
ings of preselected characteristics to measure their desirability (e.g., 
Buss, & Schmitt, 1993), importance (e.g., Buss et al., 1990; Stewart, 
Stinnett, & Rosenfeld, 2000), minimum requirements (e.g., Woodward, 
& Richards, 2005), or percentile frequency relative to the population 
(e.g., Kenrick, Groth, Trost, & Sadalla, 1993; Regan, 1998; Regan et al., 
2000), or the self (e.g., Buunk, Dijkstra, Fetchenhauer, & Kenrick, 
2002). Other methods included building an ideal partner (e.g., Zeifman, 
& Ma, 2013), ranking preselected desirable traits (e.g., Buss et al., 
1990), or allocating a limited budget to certain characteristics (Li, 2007; 
Li, Bailey, Kenrick, & Linsemeier, 2002; Li, & Kenrick, 2006). 
Among the studies that considered differential preferences in 
short- and long-term mate choices in both sexes, there is some consen-
sus that females are more selective than males, physical attractiveness 
is valued more in short- than long-term partners, and moral personality 
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traits such as dependability, honesty and warmth are valued more in 
long-term than short-term partners (e.g., Buunk, et al., 2002; Buss, & 
Schmitt, 1993; Jonason, Raulston, & Rotolo, 2012; Kenrick et al., 1993; 
Li, 2007; Li, & Kenrick, 2006; Regan, 1998; Regan et al., 2000; Stewart 
et al., 2000; Woodward, & Richards, 2005). 
However, few researchers have experimentally manipulated poten-
tial partners’ physical attractiveness and moral character simultaneous-
ly. In a forced-choice paradigm, Scheib (2001) presented pairs of men to 
female participants who were required to trade physical attractiveness 
for good character (and vice versa), either in a long-term or extra-pair 
mating context.  For each pair of stimuli, one vignette contained a less 
desirable character profile that was associated with a more physically 
attractive picture, while the second vignette contained a more desirable 
character profile but a less attractive picture. As anticipated, women 
who were asked to choose a long-term partner were more likely to prefer 
the good character man over the physically attractive man than women 
who were asked to consider an extra-pair mateship. 
Across a series of two studies, Fletcher, Tither, O’Loughlin, Friesen 
and Overall (2004) manipulated the perceived characteristics of poten-
tial mates regarding their warmth/ trustworthiness, attractive-
ness/vitality, and status/resources. Men and women were given pairs 
of experimental vignettes describing potential partners and asked to in-
dicate which of the two potential mates they would choose for each of 
three independent scenarios: a casual date, a short-term sexual affair, 
and a long-term relationship. When status/resources were held con-
stant, men preferred attractiveness/vitality to warmth/trustworthiness 
more often than women (this difference emerged both for short-term 
and long-term relationships, but not for casual dates). Additionally, for 
both sexes, the attractive but cold partner was preferred more often in 
the short-term context, while the unattractive but warm partner was 
favored more often in the long-term context. 
However, the procedures used by Scheib (2001) and Fletcher et al. 
(2004) allowed for testing only the conditions under which participants 
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would be willing to trade attractiveness for good character (and vice ver-
sa), but not how different levels of attractiveness and moral virtue mu-
tually shape initial perceptions of desirability in short-term and long-
term mate choice. Yet, deciding in favor of one potential mate and re-
jecting another should (if anything) be only the final step in mate 
choice. It is more likely that real-life mate choice can best be under-
stood as a sequential search rather than a selection process drawing 
from a set of known alternatives, because people usually tend to screen 
mates one at a time (Miller, & Todd, 1998). We argue that even the ini-
tial perceptions of desirability are dependent on the mating context. 
Specifically, physical attractiveness is expected to shape perceptions of 
desirability more strongly in short-term than in long-term mating, 
whereas moral virtue is expected to have a larger impact on long-term 
mating than on short-term mating. Furthermore, there are a number of 
reasons to assume that these effects may be more pronounced in men 
than in women. 
3.1.4 Sex differences in context-dependency 
Women may value moral virtue even with regard to their short-
term mate choices. Buss and Schmitt (1993) suggested that women 
sometimes engage in short-term mating to assess and evaluate men as 
prospective long-term partners. In addition, it has been previously 
shown that women frequently justify casual sex based on the hope that 
the sexual relationship may lead to a long-term romantic relationship 
(Li, & Kenrick, 2006). Beyond this, women tend to rate love and emo-
tional intimacy as the most compelling reasons to have an extramarital 
affair (Glass, & Wright, 1992). Furthermore, evolutionary key functions 
of females’ short-term mating strategies may relate to obtaining imme-
diate economic resources (Symons, 1979) and physical protection 
(Smuts, 1985). Either function would be contingent on finding a kind 
and trustworthy short-term partner, who will honor their mating 
agreement. From a different point of view, female preferences for moral-
ly virtuous men may be partly because most women possess a strong 
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fear of sexual aggression (Buss, 1989b). This may influence women to 
be very attentive to cues of a man’s morality, even when assessing 
short-term sexual partners. Men, on the other hand, are not assumed 
to derive benefits such as protection and resources from having a short-
term relationship with a morally virtuous woman and are less prone to 
believing that a sexual affair may evolve into a committed relationship. 
Men even place considerably greater emphasis on physical attractive-
ness than women, especially in a short-term context (Li, & Kenrick, 
2006). 
In long-term mating, however, men may react more strongly than 
women to displays of moral virtue (such as loyalty and trustworthiness). 
This may possibly reflect evolutionary pressure to minimize paternity 
uncertainty. As noted above, unwittingly investing time and resources 
in another man’s offspring is an evolutionary worst-case scenario for 
males. Indeed, men have been shown to exhibit stronger preferences for 
faithfulness and sexual loyalty (Buss, & Schmitt, 1993) and to display 
higher levels of sexual jealousy than women (Buss, Larsen, Westen, & 
Semmelroth, 1992). 
As a result, males’ preferences are expected to be more context-
dependent than females’ preferences. Specifically, male preferences are 
expected to be somewhat more “clear-cut” and more closely aligned to 
respond to particular male adaptive problems in either long-term or 
short-term mate choice than females’ preferences. Females, on the other 
hand, are expected to be more “generalist” in their mate choices than 
males. 
3.1.5 Interplay between physical attractiveness and moral virtue 
In accordance with Miller’s and Todd’s (1998) cognitive perspective 
on mate choice, we doubt that cues of a potential mate’s underlying 
qualities will be integrated linearly to form overall evaluations of desira-
bility. Jensen-Campbell, Graziano and West (1995) demonstrated that 
dominance cues positively influenced ratings of dating desirability only 
if they were paired with cues of agreeableness. Likewise, Lundy, Tan 
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and Cunningham (1998) showed that humorous individuals were rated 
more desirable as partners for a serious long-term relationship or mar-
riage than non-humorous individuals, but only if they were also physi-
cally attractive. Assuming that any desirable trait will be linearly traded 
for any other trait does not make evolutionary sense because “such 
compensatory integration of cues might prove extremely maladaptive in 
mate choice, because successful reproduction is a complex causal 
chain, only as strong as the weakest link” (Miller, & Todd, 1998, p. 
195). Therefore, if a potential mate fails to meet a certain threshold con-
cerning an important criterion trait (e.g., physical attractiveness), there 
will be little chance to compensate. Likewise, meeting or surpassing 
several requirements at once (e.g., being both highly attractive and 
morally virtuous), may be worth more than the sum of its parts. 
3.1.6 Current research 
In the current study, we simultaneously and independently ma-
nipulated female and male targets in their physical attractiveness and 
moral virtue. We then subsequently measured the impact of these ma-
nipulations on ratings of short-term and long-term desirability to test 
predictions derived from sexual strategies theory (Buss, & Schmitt, 
1993) and Miller and Todd’s (1998) cognitive perspective on mate 
choice. 
In accordance with the above-mentioned theories and existing em-
pirical data, we derived the following four hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Physical attractiveness affects perceptions of desira-
bility more strongly in short-term than in long-term mate choice. 
Hypothesis 2: Moral virtue affects perceptions of desirability more 
strongly in long-term than in short-term mate choice. 
Hypothesis 3: Perceptions of desirability depend more strongly on 
the specific mating context for males than for females. 
Hypothesis 4: Moral virtue and physical attractiveness mutually re-
inforce regarding their effects on perceptions of desirability. 
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3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Pretest of stimulus materials 
3.2.1.1 Manipulation of physical attractiveness 
Seventy-four female and 77 male students (N = 151) from a Dutch 
university were videotaped sitting in front of a white wall while intro-
ducing themselves to the camera. The videos were cut into silent 20-
second clips with ten-second transitions between clips. During transi-
tions, the identification number of the upcoming video was displayed. 
Based on these clips, 25 female and 15 male judges from a German 
university, who were aged between 19 and 32 years (M = 23.83, SD = 
3.25), rated the physical attractiveness of opposite-sex targets using a 
seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from “not attractive at all” to “very 
attractive.” Because attractiveness ratings given by both male (ICC = 
.96) and female (ICC = .95) raters reached adequate levels of inter-rater 
reliability, ratings were averaged across all raters and used as indica-
tors of physical attractiveness in the subsequent analysis. 
3.2.1.2 Manipulation of moral virtue 
Perceptions of morality were manipulated by informing participants 
of each stimulus’ hypothetical decision as a trustee in a one-shot binary 
trust game, which was described as follows: Person A (the trustor) was 
given €5 by the experimenter and could freely decide whether she would 
send these €5 to Person B (i.e., the trustee) or keep the €5 and leave the 
interaction. In the latter case, Person A would walk away with €5, while 
Person B would receive nothing. In the former case, however, the exper-
imenter would raise the amount sent by an additional €15, so Person B 
would receive a total of €20 at her disposal. If this was the case, Person 
B would then have to decide, whether to walk away with the €20 and 
send nothing back to Person A, or to send €10 back to Person A, so 
both Person A and Person B would leave the interaction with €10 each. 
The language used was as neutral as possible, i.e., we avoided words 
like “trustor”, trustee”, “trusting” etc. and used terms like “Person A”, 
“Person B”, “sending” etc. 
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Based on this description, 45 female and 20 male students from a 
German university, who were aged between 20 and 37 years (M = 23.14, 
SD = 3.35), evaluated the behavior of a hypothetical opposite-sex Person 
B in terms of morality (“Person B behaved in a morally righteous way”) 
on a seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from “does not apply at all” to 
“does fully apply.” Using a between-subjects design, half of the raters 
were told that Person B kept the whole €20 for herself, while the other 
half were told that Person B sent €10 back to Person A. 
A two-way ANOVA was conducted using the rater’s sex and Person 
B’s behavior as independent variables and the morality rating as the 
dependent variable. The ANOVA revealed that both females and males 
perceived sending €10 back to Person A to be significantly more morally 
righteous (M =5.62, SD = 1.71) than keeping the whole €20 (M = 1.90, 
SD = 1.09), F(1, 60) = 83.43, p < .001). Neither the effect of rater’s sex 
(F(1, 60) = 2.91, p = .09) nor the interaction between sex and Person B’s 
behavior (F(1, 60) = 1.73, p = .19) were significant. 
The results suggest that raters used Person B’s behavior in a bina-
ry trust game as basis for moral judgment. Therefore, we are confident 
that behavior in the trust game is suitable as a proxy for the broader 
concept of moral virtue. 
3.2.2 Main study 
3.2.2.1 Sample 
For the main study, 154 German university students registered for 
a study of “attractiveness judgments” via email and were subsequently 
assigned to participate on a prescheduled date. Two participants were 
excluded from further analyses because they failed to correctly answer 
at least one out of six control questions regarding the monetary out-
comes of the binary trust game. Another eleven participants were ex-
cluded because they reported to be homo- (n = 3) or bisexual (n = 7) or 
did not indicate their sexual orientation (n = 1). The remaining sample 
of 141 heterosexual persons comprised 84 (59.6%) females and 57 
(40.4%) males aged between 18 and 46 years (M = 24.17, SD = 4.08). 
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3.2.2.2 Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in different medium-sized lecture 
halls with several separate runs for groups of male or female raters. 
Participants were seated facing a projector screen with an appropriate 
distance between each other. 
All relevant information (except for the video clips) was provided for 
each rater in written form via questionnaire. First, subjects learned 
about the general features and consequences of the one-shot binary 
trust game described above. Thereafter, participants answered six con-
trol questions concerning the potential monetary outcomes for Persons 
A and B. Finally, participants were informed that they were about to 
rate the desirability of other-sex target persons presented on the screen 
and that these target persons had participated in the trust game as Per-
son B (i.e., the trustee). 
Half of the participants were asked to rate the target persons’ de-
sirability as short-term sexual partners (i.e., “for a short-term sexual 
affair”). The other half of the participants were asked to rate the target 
persons’ desirability as long-term romantic partners (i.e., “for a long-
term relationship”). 
For each target person, raters were provided information regarding 
the target’s behavior in the trust game. Information regarding targets’ 
behavior as trustees was presented using a randomized and counter-
balanced design, i.e., half of the participants were informed that a given 
target person had send €10 back to Person A (i.e., behaved trustworthi-
ly), while the other half of the participants were informed that the very 
same target person had kept the whole €20 (i.e., behaved untrustwor-
thily). 
The written information concerning targets’ behavior was matched 
with the corresponding video clips using identification numbers, which 
were announced on screen prior to each clip. Thereby, participants were 
able to integrate their perceptions of the targets’ physical appearance 
and moral virtue accordingly, and to generate an overall desirability rat-
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ing. All desirability ratings were gathered on a seven-point Likert-type 
scale ranging from “not desirable at all” to “very desirable”. 
After completion of the video-based rating procedure, participants 
answered questions concerning their basic socio-demographic data, 
were thanked and dismissed. Thirteen randomly selected participants 
were awarded with cash prizes ranging from €10 to €100 (1 x €100, 2 x 
€50, 10 x €10). 
In sum, female and male target persons of various levels of physi-
cal attractiveness were randomly presented as either trustworthy or un-
trustworthy to raters of the opposite sex. Raters then evaluated each 
target’s desirability either as a short- or long-term partner. 
3.3 Results 
To account for the fact that information about targets’ behavior in 
the trust game and mating context varied randomly within targets and 
between raters, we estimated a mixed regression model, which treated 
both raters and targets as random effects (Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 
2012). The unit of analysis was a rater by target observation. Each row 
of data represented the desirability rating given by a specific rater to a 
specific target (dependent variable), with mating context (short-term vs. 
long-term), rater’s sex (female vs. male), target’s z-standardized (sepa-
rately within sexes) physical attractiveness score (as provided by exoge-
nous raters), and target’s trustworthiness (untrustworthy vs. trustwor-
thy) as independent variables. The estimated model included four fixed 
effects (mating context, target’s trustworthiness, rater’s sex, and target’s 
physical attractiveness), six two-way interactions, four three-way inter-
actions, and one four-way interaction, as well as three random error 
components: variation in the intercept due to targets, raters, and ran-
dom error at the level of rater by target observation. 
The analysis of the random components of the model indicated 
significant variability in the desirability ratings across targets (Wald Z = 
5.70, p < .001) and raters (Wald Z = 8.04, p < .001), i.e., targets’ desira-
bility ratings varied significantly across raters and targets. 
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With regard to the fixed effects, the four-way interaction was not 
significant (F(1, 10398) = 1.57, p = .21); therefore, we proceeded directly 
to analyzing lower-order interactions, which were arranged in the same 
order as our initial hypotheses (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Mixed regression model with desirability ratings as the de-
pendent variable 
 F p 
Fixed effects   
Mating context  0.32 .58 
Rater’s sex  46.40*** < .001 
Target’s attractiveness 2,558.28*** < .001 
Target’s trustworthiness  278.33*** < .001 
Mating context x rater’s sex 1.85 .18 
Mating context x target’s attractiveness 81.22*** < .001 
Mating context x target’s trustworthiness 106.15*** < .001 
Rater’s sex x target’s attractiveness 88.13*** < .001 
Rater’s sex x target’s trustworthiness 0.00 .98 
Target’s attractiveness  
 x target’s trustworthiness 
21.26*** < .001 
Mating context x rater’s sex  
 x target’s attractiveness 
38.71*** < .001 
Mating context x rater’s sex  
 x target’s trustworthiness 
18.70*** < .001 
Mating context x target’s attractiveness  
 x target’s trustworthiness 
20.19*** < .001 
Rater’s sex x target’s attractiveness  
 x target’s trustworthiness 
0.36 .55 
Mating context x rater’s sex  
 x target’s attractiveness  
 x target’s trustworthiness 
1.57 .21 
Random effects   
Variance due to raters 0.49*** < .001 
Variance due to targets 0.03*** < .001 
Error variance 1.11*** < .001 
-2 Log Likelihood 32,135.71 
Note. *** p < .001. 
Hypothesis 1 stated that physical attractiveness would affect per-
ceptions of desirability more strongly in short-term than long-term mate 
choice. As predicted, there was a significant two-way interaction be-
tween physical attractiveness and mating context (F(1, 10383) = 81.22, 
p < .001), indicating that the impact of physical attractiveness on mate 
desirability ratings was stronger in the short-term (battractiveness = 1.03, p 
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< .001) than in the long-term (battractiveness = 0.86, p < .001) mating con-
text. 
Hypothesis 2 stated that moral virtue would affect perceptions of 
desirability more strongly in long-term than short-term mate choice. A 
significant interaction among targets’ trustworthiness and mating con-
text showed this to be the case, F(1, 10396) = 106.15, p < .001. That is, 
displays of trustworthiness more greatly impacted desirability ratings in 
the long-term context (btrustworthiness = 0.57, p < .001) than the short-term 
context (btrustworthiness = 0.16, p < .001). 
Hypothesis 3 stated that perceptions of desirability would depend 
more strongly on the specific mating context for males than for females. 
This hypothesis was supported with respect to both physical attractive-
ness and trustworthiness. First, there was a significant three-way inter-
action between physical attractiveness, mating context, and raters’ sex, 
F(1, 10383) = 38.71, p < .001. This indicates that male raters were more 
prone to prioritize physical attractiveness in short-term as compared to 
long-term mate choice (battractiveness*context = -0.33, p < .001) than female 
raters (battractiveness*context = -.0.06, p < .05), see Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: Short-term and long-term desirability ratings of physical-
ly attractive (one standard deviation above the mean) and physical-
ly unattractive (one standard deviation below the mean) targets for 
female and male raters 
    
Second, there was a significant three-way interaction between tar-
gets’ trustworthiness, mating context, and raters’ sex, F(1, 10396) = 
18.70, p < .001. This interaction indicates that the temporal context of 
mating exerted a stronger influence on male (btrustworthiness*context = 0.63, p 
< .001) than on female (btrustworthiness*context = 0.26, p < .001) preferences 
for displays of moral behavior. Namely, the strength of female prefer-
ences for males’ trustworthiness increased from slight (btrustworthiness = 
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0.23, p < .001) in short-term mating to moderate in long-term mating 
(btrustworthiness = 0.49, p < .001), whereas the strength of male preferences 
for females’ trustworthiness increased from non-existent in short-term 
mating (btrustworthiness = 0.04, p = .36) to strong in long-term mating 
(btrustworthiness = 0.68, p < .001), see Figure 3. In summary, the magnitude 
of preferences concerning both physical attractiveness and moral virtue 
was more dependent on the temporal context of mating for males than 
for females. 
Figure 3: Short-term and long-term desirability ratings of targets 
who were described as either trustworthy or untrustworthy for fe-
male and male raters 
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Hypothesis 4 stated that moral virtue and physical attractiveness 
would mutually reinforce regarding their effects on perceptions of desir-
ability. As anticipated, we found a significant interaction between tar-
gets’ trustworthiness and physical attractiveness (F(1, 10397) = 21.26, p 
< .001), which was qualified by a three-way interaction with mating 
context (F(1, 10399) = 20.19, p < .001). More specifically, trustworthy 
individuals were rated as more desirable short-term partners, regard-
less of their physical attractiveness. Stated differently, physically attrac-
tive individuals were rated as more desirable short-term partners re-
gardless of their trustworthiness (btrustworthiness*attractiveness = 0.01, p = .69). 
In contrast, targets’ trustworthiness and physical attractiveness mutu-
ally reinforced in the long-term mating context (btrustworthiness*attractiveness = 
0.20, p < .001). Namely, in long-term mating, targets’ trustworthiness 
impacted ratings of attractive targets (btrustworthiness = 0.76, p < .001) con-
siderably more than for less attractive targets (btrustworthiness = 0.37, p < 
.001), see Figure 4. As predicted by Hypothesis 4, physical attractive-
ness and perceptions of moral virtue mutually reinforced each other, 
but only in a long-term mating context. 
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Figure 4: Short-term and long-term desirability ratings of physical-
ly attractive (one standard deviation above the mean) and physical-
ly unattractive (one standard deviation below the mean) targets 
who were described either as trustworthy or untrustworthy 
 
 
3.4 Discussion 
In summary, our results support all four of our initial hypotheses. 
Physical attractiveness shaped perceptions of desirability more strongly 
in short-term than in long-term mating (Hypothesis 1), and moral virtue 
impacted long-term mating more than short-term mating (Hypothesis 
2). Furthermore, we demonstrated that males adjust their mate choice 
criteria more strongly to the given mating context than women (Hypoth-
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esis 3), and that physical attractiveness and moral virtue mutually rein-
force each other (Hypothesis 4), albeit only in a long-term mating con-
text. 
Our results contribute to the research of preferential mate choice 
both on a methodological and theoretical level. First, we were able to 
replicate results obtained by Scheib (2001) and Fletcher et al. (2004) 
using a different and innovative methodology. Physical attractiveness 
played a lesser role in long-term than short-term mate choice, while the 
opposite was true for moral virtue. These findings are congruent with 
previous survey-based studies of mate preferences (e.g., Buss, & 
Schmitt, 1993; Regan et al., 2000; Stewart et al., 2000). However, we 
argue that our methodology is particularly ecologically valid. Real-life 
mate choice most likely does not entail a conscious ex-ante definition of 
certain standards concerning various criteria, and it usually does not 
comprise choices between known alternatives each of whom have spe-
cific strengths and weaknesses (Miller, & Todd, 1998). Rather, real-life 
mate choice is generally expected to operate on differences in attraction 
to distinct potential partners. Therefore, it can be best understood as a 
process of sequential choice and general “screening” of potential part-
ners in terms of desirability (Miller, & Todd, 1998). In conclusion, ma-
nipulating the characteristics of potential partners and measuring dif-
ferences in perceptions of desirability appears to be reasonable and eco-
logically valid. 
Second, we found some evidence that males’ preferences were more 
context-dependent than females’ preferences, regarding both physical 
attractiveness and moral virtue. For men, potential partners’ physical 
attractiveness more greatly impacted short-term than long-term mate 
choice, whereas moral virtue was more relevant in long-term than 
short-term mate choice. Females, on the other hand, appeared to be 
more generalist and less context-specific in the way they evaluated po-
tential mates. Future research must specifically address the question of 
why this is the case and under which conditions. Some women may en-
tertain the idea that a short-term sexual affair could lead to a long-term 
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romantic relationship (Buss, & Schmitt, 1993; Li, & Kenrick, 2006). 
They may then apply some of their selection criteria for long-term part-
ners to short-term partners. Other women may shy away from having 
even a short-term sexual relationship with an immoral man due to a 
strong fear of sexual aggression (Buss, 1989b). Men, on the contrary, 
were prone to prioritize moral virtue considerably more strongly in long-
term than short-term mating. In a study by Buss and Schmitt (1993), 
American men rated faithfulness and sexual loyalty to be the most de-
sirable traits and unfaithfulness to be the least desirable trait in poten-
tial long-term female partners. In short-term mating, however, female 
displays of moral virtue did not affect their overall desirability, whereas 
female physical attractiveness had a distinctly strong effect on desirabil-
ity. It appears that in short-term mating, moral virtue is of no concern 
for men. In this context, men rely solely on cues of health and fertility 
as the basis of their desirability judgments. 
Third, other than Scheib (2001) and Fletcher et al. (2004), we ma-
nipulated physical attractiveness and displays of moral virtue simulta-
neously and independently; this allowed us to gain insights concerning 
the way these cues are integrated and how they jointly shape percep-
tions of desirability. In long-term mating, in which physical attractive-
ness and moral virtue both were important predictors of desirability, 
these variables were mutually reinforcing. In other words, displays of 
moral virtue had greater bearing on the perceived desirability of attrac-
tive targets than less attractive targets (and vice versa). This may sug-
gest that desirability is more than the sum of its parts, which is congru-
ent with Miller and Todd’s (1998) cognitive perspective of mate choice. 
Future research must further investigate and clarify the proximate 
mechanisms underlying these effects. In our study, we used cues that 
were related to different underlying qualities (i.e., health, fertility, and 
good genes vs. moral virtue and good character), which were presented 
simultaneously. In future studies, researchers should vary both the na-
ture and magnitude of different cues (e.g., facial vs. bodily attractive-
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ness, or good character vs. economic resources), and account for the 
sequence in which these cues are integrated. 
Regarding the generalizability of our results, some limitations must 
be addressed. First, we recruited a student sample with a mean age of 
only 24.17 years. Traits that women and men prioritize in a partner 
may be subject not only to sex and mating context, but also to socioec-
onomic, psychological, and cultural variables, such as age, income, ed-
ucation, sociosexual orientation, and the level of female empowerment 
in a culture. However, we assume that people in their mid-twenties are 
a fairly good starting point for investigating mate-choice criteria. 
Second, we used behavioral information regarding decisions as 
trustee in a one-shot trust game as a proxy for moral virtue. Though 
this information was unequivocally used as the basis for moral judg-
ment, one may think of various other cues of morality (e.g., unfaithful-
ness in a previous relationship or tax evasion), which may potentially 
evoke stronger or weaker effects. However, experimental vignettes con-
taining rather mundane and lifelike cues of the presence of moral vir-
tue, or lack thereof, may differ latently in dimensions other than the one 
that was intended for manipulation. We are confident that informing 
raters of targets’ decisions in an experimental game appears to be both 
highly credible and unlikely to corrupt neutrality. 
In summary, it can be stated that the current research has eluci-
dated the way physical attractiveness and moral virtue shape percep-
tions of desirability in females’ and males’ short- and long-term mate 
choices. We have also confirmed the significance of sexual strategies 
theory as a key concept governing preferential mate choice using an in-
novative and ecologically valid methodology. Furthermore, we have 
gained firsthand insights into sex differences regarding the context-
dependency of mate preferences, which is a subject that must be fur-
ther investigated in future studies. Finally, our research has provided 
an empirical backing to the cognitive perspective of mate choice and 
confirmed that desirability is more than the sum of its parts. 
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Groundbreaking contributions to mate choice research, such as 
parental investment theory (Trivers, 1972) or sexual strategies theory 
(Buss, & Schmitt, 1993), have inspired countless researchers to push 
the boundaries of what is known about human mate choice. However, it 
appears to be just the tip of the iceberg. Human mating appears to be 
more complex than one may be inclined to think. 
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4 On the social perception of trust: warmth, competence, and 
global evaluations 
4.1 Introduction 
Trust may be considered the single most important underpinning 
of virtually any kind of social relationship. Without trust, intimate rela-
tionships would be fleeting and shallow (Dion, & Dion, 1976; Larzelere, 
& Huston, 1980; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985), organizational life 
would be riddled with demoralizing mutual suspicion (Kramer, 1999; 
Kramer, & Tyler, 1996), economies would fall into decline (Knack, & 
Keefer, 1997; Zak, & Knack, 2001), and democracies would perish (Fu-
kuyama, 1995; Sullivan, & Transue, 1999). However, no matter how 
essential trust is for human social coexistence, researchers struggle to 
answer the question of exactly why people trust one another. People 
trust even when they are told that the odds of reciprocation are low and 
when there is little or even nothing to gain (Dunning, Fetchenhauer, & 
Schlösser, 2012; Fetchenhauer, & Dunning, 2012). Likewise, people 
systematically underestimate others’ trustworthiness but trust nonethe-
less (Fetchenhauer, & Dunning, 2009). These findings challenge the 
view that trust is an economic, instrumental act governed by percep-
tions of risk and expectations of future benefit (e.g., Rousseau, Sitkin, 
Burt, & Camerer, 1998). Rather, trust appears to be an expressive act 
governed by the emotions surrounding the act of trusting itself and not 
its potential consequences (Dunning, & Fetchenhauer, 2010; Dunning 
et al., 2012). We will add to the ongoing discussion of why people trust 
by exploring some noneconomic reputational benefits (or costs) that 
trust behavior may convey. Specifically, we will examine how trust is 
perceived with regard to fundamental dimensions of social judgment 
and person perception, namely, warmth and competence, and how the-
se perceptions translate into global evaluations of the character of oth-
ers. 
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4.1.1 Social perception of trust 
A noneconomic explanation for trust is that trust serves as some 
kind of social signal, boosting an individual’s reputation as a valuable 
cooperation partner (Dunning et al., 2012). Indeed, humans sometimes 
behave selflessly to strategically invest in their reputations among their 
peers (e.g., Barclay, 2013; Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; 
Nowak, & Sigmund, 2005; Semmann, Krambeck, & Milinski, 2004). 
However, what exactly is required to have a reputation as a valuable 
cooperation partner? A likely and obvious answer is that people prefer 
partners who are both willing and able to cooperate, a notion that finds 
strong support in the vast literature on social judgment and perception 
(e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Cuddy, Glick, & Beninger, 2011; 
Wojciszke, 2005). 
Therefore, the two basic dimensions of social perception and social 
judgment are warmth (also referred to as morality) and competence (for 
a review see Cuddy et al., 2011; Fiske et al., 2007). Perceptions of 
warmth relate to the social and moral evaluation of an individual and 
therefore refer to perceived intent. Competence refers to perceived abil-
ity and therefore finds its expression in judgments of ability and intel-
lectual prowess. Thus, perceptions of warmth and competence jointly 
reflect basic aspects of survival, namely, whether others intend to harm 
or to help and whether they will be able to carry out these intentions 
(Fiske et al., 2007). 
Still, one must address the question of whether and how trustful 
behavior influences perceptions of warmth and competence. The prob-
lem with trust is that it might be a double-edged sword, both in terms of 
warmth and in terms of competence. This means that depending on the 
specific situation, trustful behavior may be perceived as warm or cold 
and, likewise, as competent or incompetent. The following examples 
may serve to illustrate this dichotomy. 
Consider warmth: Lending your station wagon to a friend because 
he is moving requires some trust in your friend. Similarly, asking a 
neighbor to feed your cat while you are on a vacation requires trust in 
52 
 
your neighbor. Although both actions entail trusting someone, the for-
mer seems to be rather charitable and may be perceived as a sign of 
warmth, whereas the latter appears to be rather self-interested and 
cold. Now consider competence: Trusting a certified car mechanic at a 
licensed auto repair shop to properly fix your car’s brakes seems rather 
smart and may therefore evoke notions of competence, whereas getting 
the job done at a run-down back alley workshop may be associated with 
gullibility or even foolishness and thus may call forth associations of 
incompetence. 
However, even a single instance of trustful behavior may lead to 
entirely different inferences regarding warmth and competence. Consid-
er the standard behavioral measure of generalized trust: the trust game, 
also referred to as the investment game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 
1995; for a recent review, see Johnson, & Mislin, 2011). Two subjects, 
the trustor and the trustee, are randomly paired for an anonymous one-
shot interaction. The trustor receives some money from the experiment-
er and is free to keep the money and leave the interaction (i.e., to dis-
trust) or to send some proportion of the money to an unknown trustee 
(i.e., to trust). In the latter case, the experimenter will multiply the sent 
amount and pass it on to the trustee. The trustee is now free to decide 
how much of the multiplied amount he wants to keep for himself and 
how much he wants to send back to the trustor. However, what do peo-
ple think of those who trust or distrust in such a situation? 
Regarding competence, one needs to keep in mind that from a 
strictly economic perspective, trusting is never rational. Every rational 
and self-interested trustee should never reciprocate because the inter-
action is anonymous and onetime. Therefore, every rational and self-
interested trustor should never trust because he should anticipate inev-
itable deceit. However, many trustees choose to reciprocate (Berg et al., 
1995; Fetchenhauer, & Dunning, 2009; Johnson, & Mislin, 2011). Giv-
en sufficient risk tolerance and substantial chances of trust being met 
with reciprocity, trusting may well be rational, even in a strictly eco-
nomic sense. 
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Even regarding warmth, however, the situation is ambiguous: Does 
a trustor send his money to the trustee because he feels some moral 
obligation to do so? Do empathy, compassion and a striving for fairness 
lead to trust, so that the trustee does not have to leave the interaction 
empty-handed, or is there only cold and selfish calculation, with trust 
solely driven by the desire to maximize one’s own payoff? Some re-
searchers have shown that altruism is a positive predictor of trust be-
havior in the trust game (e.g., Kanagaretnam, Mestelman, Nainar, & 
Shehata, 2009). However, others have gone to great lengths to disen-
tangle trust from altruism and to prove that other-regarding preferences 
are by no means sufficient to explain trust (Cox, 2004; Dunning et al., 
2012). Moreover, even if a trustor’s motivation is purely altruistic and 
selfless, people are prone to construing selfless behavior in terms of 
self-interest, i.e., they are overly cynical concerning the motives under-
lying others’ behavior (Critcher, & Dunning, 2011). Therefore, answer-
ing the question of how trust behavior is perceived by others is by no 
means trivial, especially in the frame of the trust game. 
Krueger, Massey, and DiDonato (2008) provide first insight into the 
social perception of trust: In the context of a one-shot continuous trust 
game following the Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) procedure, sub-
jects rated a trustor who had invested either $0, $5, or $10 with regard 
to four different traits pertaining to warmth and competence. Percep-
tions of trustors’ warmth were positively associated with the amounts 
invested. However, ratings of competence were only weakly related to 
the proportions invested. Specifically, only players who invested partial 
amounts ($5) were judged to be slightly more competent than were 
players investing either nothing or their full endowment of $10, whereas 
the ones who invested nothing were not judged to be more or less com-
petent than were the ones who invested their full endowment. Overall, 
the effects on ratings of competence were so weak that the authors 
doubted their practical significance. 
With preliminary evidence indicating a positive relationship be-
tween trust and perceptions of warmth but no meaningful relationship 
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between trust and perceptions of competence, one must further consid-
er that sources of ambiguity in the social judgment of trust behavior 
may not only arise out of the act of trusting itself. An additional source 
of ambiguity may lie within the observer of trustful or distrustful behav-
ior. Specifically, people may adjust their judgments of others’ warmth 
and competence under consideration of whether they would have trust-
ed or distrusted in a similar situation. We will refer to this as social pro-
jection. 
4.1.2 Social projection 
People tend to use themselves as standards for comparison in so-
cial judgment and frequently imagine how they would react if they were 
in someone else’s situation (Dunning, & Hayes, 1996). Social projection 
may not only lead to biased inferences concerning how others would 
behave in a specific situation given one’s own presumed behavior but 
may also cause biased judgments concerning the dispositions underly-
ing others’ dissimilar behavior (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977; Van 
Boven, & Loewenstein, 2005). 
Especially with regard to judgments of competence, one may intui-
tively argue that the social judgment of other’s trustful or distrustful 
behavior is likely subject to social projection. If someone acts trustfully 
in a situation where someone else would not exhibit trust (e.g., lending 
one’s cellphone to a sneaky-looking stranger), that someone else may 
regard such behavior as gullible or naïve and thus question the actor’s 
competence. Rotter (1980) distinguishes trust from gullibility by defin-
ing trust “as believing communications in the absence of clear or strong 
reasons for not believing” (p. 4) and gullibility “as believing when most 
people in the same social group would consider belief naïve and foolish” 
(p. 4) and arrives at the conclusion that “high trusters are no more gul-
lible than low trusters” (p. 4). However, people who would not trust in 
the very same situation are likely to perceive such “clear or strong rea-
sons” not to trust and may therefore associate trust with gullibility. 
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Similarly, people who would trust in the same situation may instead 
regard others’ distrust as a sign of incompetence. 
However, perceptions of warmth may also be subject to these con-
siderations. People scrutinize selfless behavior for selfish motives 
(Critcher, & Dunning, 2011). This effect may even be stronger for people 
who would distrust in a similar situation because they may try to main-
tain self-serving assessments concerning their own moral superiority 
(e.g., Epley, & Dunning, 2000; for reviews, see Alicke, & Govorun, 2005; 
Gilovich, Epley, & Hanko, 2005). Additionally, they are likely to experi-
ence greater understanding for and empathy towards those who dis-
trust. Likewise, people who would trust in a similar situation may feel 
moral outrage and condemn distrustful behavior even more severely. 
Consequently, social projection can be assumed to affect judg-
ments of both warmth and competence with regard to both distrustful 
and trustful behavior. However, Krueger et al. (2008) examined whether 
judgments of trustors’ warmth and competence were moderated by 
raters’ own hypothetical decisions in the role of the trustor. The only 
statistically significant effect emerged concerning ratings of competence, 
i.e., raters who would personally trust less perceived a fully investing 
trustor to be more competent than did raters who would also fully in-
vest. This finding was not in line with any of the authors’ a priori hy-
potheses and was therefore considered an anomaly. Still, ruling out the 
effects of social projection on perceptions of trust and distrust altogeth-
er might be a bit premature, especially on the basis of only one study. 
Across two studies, we therefore further investigated the potential ef-
fects of social projection on perceptions of trust and distrust. 
4.2 Study 1 
Study 1 aimed at investigating how trust and distrust shape per-
ceptions of warmth and competence and whether social projection in-
fluences these perceptions. Different from Krueger et al. (2008), we em-
ployed a binary instead of a continuous trust game as the situational 
environment for the rating procedure. In the binary trust game we em-
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ployed, Person A (the trustor) was said to be endowed with €5 by the 
experimenter and could freely decide whether she would send her en-
dowment (i.e., trust) to an unknown Person B (the trustee) or whether 
she would keep the money and leave the interaction (i.e., distrust). If 
Person A decided to distrust, she would walk away with €5, and Person 
B would receive nothing. However, if Person A decided to trust Person 
B, the experimenter would raise the amount sent by an additional €15, 
so Person B would receive a total of €20 at her disposal. If this was the 
case, Person B would then have to decide whether to walk away with 
the €20, sending nothing back to Person A, or whether to send €10 
back to Person A, so both Person A and Person B would leave the inter-
action with €10 each. 
In the continuous trust game, partial transfers are difficult to in-
terpret: Does a trustor who sends half his endowment trust halfway, or 
does he distrust halfway? More importantly, how would such a person 
decide if she were forced to choose either full trust or full distrust? Be-
cause the binary trust game allows only for all-or-nothing decisions and 
thus eliminates the problem of partial transfers, it is arguably easier to 
interpret and has found widespread use (e.g., Bohnet, & Zeckhauser, 
2004; Dunning, & Fetchenhauer, 2010, Eckel, & Wilson, 2004; 
Fetchenhauer, & Dunning, 2009, 2010, 2012; Snijders, & Keren, 2001). 
4.2.1 Method 
4.2.1.1 Sample 
A total of 140 participants agreed to participate in a survey on per-
sonality assessment during an introductory psychology lecture for un-
dergraduate students of the social sciences at a large German universi-
ty. Three participants were excluded from further analyses because they 
failed to correctly answer at least one out of six control questions re-
garding the monetary outcomes of the trust game. The remaining sam-
ple of 137 persons comprised 92 (67.2%) females and 45 (32.8%) males 
aged between 18 and 31 years (M = 23.20, SD = 2.47). 
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4.2.1.2 Procedure 
First, all subjects learned about the general features and conse-
quences of the one-shot binary trust game described above. The lan-
guage used was as neutral as possible, i.e., we avoided words such as 
“trustor”, “trustee”, “trusting”, etc., and used terms such as “Person A”, 
“Person B”, “sending”, etc. instead. Thereafter, participants answered 
six control questions concerning the potential monetary outcomes for 
Persons A and B. 
Second, participants were told that they were about to assess sev-
eral characteristics of a person who had participated in the previously 
illustrated game in the role of Person A (i.e., the trustor). In a between-
subjects experimental design, we manipulated two factors: 
Target’s trust decision. Participants were told either that Person A 
had kept the €5 for herself (i.e., distrusted) or that she had send the €5 
to Person B (i.e., trusted). However, in the latter case, participants were 
not informed about the outcome of the interaction, i.e., they did not 
know whether Person B had reciprocated or defected. 
Target’s sex. Half of the participants were informed that Person A 
was female, and the other half were informed that Person A was male. 
However, because this factor did not yield any effects on perceptions of 
warmth and competence, it will not be further addressed. 
After the manipulation, subjects assessed to what extent a number 
of preselected traits applied to the hypothetical Person A described pre-
viously. All ratings were captured on seven-point Likert-type scales 
ranging from “does not apply at all” to “fully applies”. The items “Person 
A is pleasant”, “…friendly”, and “…amiable” were averaged to build an 
integrated measure of warmth (α = .94). The items “Person A is intelli-
gent”, “…competent”, and “…educated” were averaged to form a compe-
tence scale (α = .83). 
After the rating of traits, participants indicated how they would de-
cide in the role of Person A if they were in a similar situation (rater’s 
trust decision). Finally, all participants answered some questions con-
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cerning their basic sociodemographic data and were thanked and dis-
missed. 
4.2.2 Results 
Overall, 24.1% of the raters indicated that they would not have 
trusted in a similar situation, whereas 75.9% claimed that they would 
have sent their endowment to an unknown Person B. Raters’ own hypo-
thetical trust decisions were not contingent upon the target’s alleged 
decisions, implying that raters did not unreflectingly follow the target’s 
example, χ²(1, N = 137) = 1.87, p = .23. Because the rater’s hypothetical 
decision and the target’s alleged decision were unrelated, they could 
both be utilized as explanatory variables in a set of two-way ANOVAs 
with perceptions of warmth and of competence as the respective de-
pendent variables. 
There was a significant overlap between judgments of warmth and 
of competence (r = .51, p < .001) if the target decided to trust, but no 
significant correlation (r = -.05, p = .72) if the target decided to distrust 
(Fisher-Z = 3.48, p < .001). 
4.2.2.1 Warmth 
To investigate the effects of trust and social projection on percep-
tions of warmth, we used a two-way ANOVA with ratings of warmth as 
the dependent variable and the target’s and rater’s trust decisions as 
the explanatory variables. 
The target’s trust decision had a significant main effect on ratings 
of warmth, F(1, 133) = 82.52, p < .001. This means that targets who de-
cided to send the €5 to Person B (i.e., who trusted) were evaluated more 
favorably in terms of warmth (M = 5.42, SD = 1.25) than were those who 
kept their endowment (M = 3.27, SD = 1.14). 
The raters’ own hypothetical trust decisions had a significant main 
effect on perceptions of warmth, F(1, 133) = 7.85, p < .01. This means 
that raters who would have trusted if they had been in the same situa-
tion as the target were on average less generous in their ratings of 
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warmth (M = 4.18, SD = 1.67) than were those who would not have 
trusted (M = 4.57, SD = 1.36). 
Finally, there was no interaction between target’s trust decision 
and rater’s trust decision, F(1, 133) = 0.06, p = .81. This means that 
even raters who would not have trusted were likely to perceive trustful 
targets to be more pleasant, friendly, and amiable than distrustful tar-
gets (see Figure 5). Likewise, raters who would have trusted in a similar 
situation were less generous in their judgments of warmth regardless of 
whether the respective target had decided to trust or to distrust. 
Figure 5: Ratings of warmth as a function of the target’s stated and 
the rater’s hypothetical trust decisions 
 
4.2.2.2 Competence 
We explored the effects of trust and social projection on percep-
tions of competence using a two-way ANOVA with ratings of competence 
as the dependent variable and the target’s and rater’s trust decisions as 
the explanatory variables. 
Neither the target’s trust decision (F(1, 133) = 2.21, p = .14) nor the 
rater’s own decision (F(1, 133) = 1.07, p = .30) had main effects on rat-
ings of competence. However, there was a significant interaction be-
tween the target’s decision and the rater’s decision, F(1, 133) = 31.11, p 
< .001. Bonferroni-corrected multiple comparisons revealed that dis-
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trustful targets obtained higher ratings of competence from distrustful 
raters than they did from trustful raters (p < .001), whereas trustful 
targets were judged more favorably by trustful than by distrustful raters 
(p < .001). Moreover, the moderating effect of social projection was so 
pronounced that trustful raters actually judged trustful targets to be 
significantly (p < .001) more competent (M = 5.38, SD = 0.82) than they 
judged distrustful targets (M = 4.08, SD = 0.98), whereas distrustful 
raters judged trustful targets to be significantly (p < .05) less competent 
(M = 4.17, SD = 0.94) than they judged distrustful targets (M = 4.92, SD 
= 0.82) to be (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Ratings of competence as a function of the target’s stated 
and the rater’s hypothetical trust decisions 
 
4.2.3 Discussion 
The results indicate that behavior in the trust game served as a 
basis for trait inferences concerning both warmth and competence. Our 
measures of warmth and competence exhibited a positive correlation, 
but only if targets behaved distrustfully. This means that distrustful 
targets were often perceived to be as incompetent as they were cold, 
whereas judgments of trustful targets appeared to be more differentiat-
ed in terms of warmth and competence. In other words: a so-called “ha-
lo” effect, which has often been observed with regard to isolated judg-
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ments of individual targets (e.g., Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, 
Kashima, 2005; Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968), only 
emerged with regard to the evaluation of distrustful rather than trustful 
targets. 
The structure of the effects differed notably for warmth and compe-
tence. On the one hand, regarding warmth, our results were in accord-
ance with previous findings by Krueger et al. (2008), indicating that 
trustful targets obtained higher ratings of warmth than did distrustful 
targets regardless of the rater’s own hypothetical decision. On the other 
hand, regarding competence, we found a strong interaction between the 
target’s decision and the rater’s own hypothetical decision. Raters who 
would have trusted in a similar situation rated trustful targets to be 
considerably more competent than distrustful targets. However, dis-
trustful raters rated trustful targets to be less competent than distrust-
ful targets. 
The results of Study 1 lead to the notion that social projection ac-
tually has a bearing on social judgment, but only in the domain of per-
ceived competence and not in that of warmth. Overall, given the cir-
cumstance that most raters (75.9%) would themselves have trusted, the 
reputational consequences of trustful behavior seem to be extraordi-
narily positive. 
However, social projection is not the only source of potential bias. 
Specifically, the social perception of trust may be subject not only to the 
effects of social projection but also to the actual outcomes of trustful or 
distrustful behavior. We will refer to this as consequentialism. 
4.3 Study 2 
Whereas social projection might partially reflect the anticipated 
consequences of trust, consequentialism pertains to the question of 
whether the inferences drawn from trustful (and distrustful) behavior 
are subject to the actual consequences of trust, i.e., whether trust is (or 
would be) rewarded or exploited by the trustee. On the one hand, traits 
inferred from trust behavior may account only for the act of trusting vs. 
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distrusting, which would be indicative of a deontological style of social 
judgment. On the other hand, however, observers may base their judg-
ments on the consequences of trusting vs. distrusting, which would 
speak for a consequentialist style of social judgment. 
In their seminal article on outcome bias, Baron and Hershey (1988) 
demonstrated that people tend to rate thinking as better and decision 
makers as more competent when the outcome of a financial decision is 
favorable than when it is unfavorable, even if they were explicitly told to 
ignore the outcome. Outcome-based judgments of decisions and deci-
sion makers do not only occur in the domain of financial decision mak-
ing and not only with regard to perceptions of competence; they also 
pertain to the evaluation of moral decisions (Gino, Shu, & Bazerman, 
2010; Lipshitz, 1989; Lipshitz, & Barak, 1995). However, studies using 
cognitive load manipulations showed that quick and intuitive judgments 
of morality appear to be deontological rather than consequentialist 
(Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). 
It has been shown that individuals’ trust decisions are predicted 
only by how they feel about the act of trusting or distrusting and not by 
how they feel about the potential consequences of doing the one or the 
other (Dunning, & Fetchenhauer, 2010; Dunning et al., 2012). Similar-
ly, people place substantial trust in their peers, even when the odds of 
reciprocation are low (Fetchenhauer, & Dunning, 2012) and even 
though many trustors expect to be betrayed (Fetchenhauer, & Dunning, 
2009). This all leads to the notion that individual trust decisions do not 
follow a consequentialist logic (Dunning et al., 2012; Dunning, & 
Fetchenhauer, 2010). However, it remains to be examined whether the 
social perception of these decisions is equally non-consequentialist. 
Therefore, Study 2 accounted for the potential effects of consequential-
ism. 
Study 1 provided us with insights on how trust behavior shapes 
the two basic dimensions of social judgment, namely, perceptions of 
warmth and of competence. However, it still remains to be answered 
how these perceptions translate into global evaluations of personality. 
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Previous research suggests that judgments of warmth usually precede 
judgments of competence (Cuddy et al., 2011; Fiske et al., 2007) and 
that others’ behavior is construed more frequently in terms of warmth 
rather than in terms of competence (Wojciszke, 1994, 2005). Similarly, 
perceived warmth has a larger impact on behavioral and affective re-
sponses and appears to be a stronger predictor of global evaluations of 
others’ character than are judgments of competence (Wojciszke, 2005). 
In other words, judgments of warmth dominate social perception 
(Wojciszke, 2005), which is, however, not to say that perceived compe-
tence would not have any bearing on global evaluations. Therefore, in 
Study 2 we explored how trust and distrust affected global judgments of 
others’ personalities. 
Furthermore, the rating procedure employed in Study 1 may have 
caused effects of experimenter demand (Orne, 1962). In particular, by 
providing raters with specific traits referring to either warmth or compe-
tence, we may have inadvertently primed the salience of these two di-
mensions and thus prompted raters to think about the traits in ques-
tion and to construe targets’ behavior with respect to these terms. 
Thus, we provided raters with the opportunity to freely associate 
personality traits of their own choice in Study 2. Subsequently, we ex-
amined how the resulting personality profiles were perceived with re-
gard to global evaluations of personality. This elaborate rating proce-
dure served to reduce potential effects of experimenter demand and to 
facilitate free and unbiased trait inferences. 
4.3.1 Method 
In Phase 1, participants freely ascribed personality traits of their 
own choice to trustful or distrustful targets. To account for the potential 
effects of consequentialism, we systematically manipulated information 
on the outcomes of the trust or distrust decisions, i.e., whether trust or 
distrust turned out to be warranted or unwarranted. In Phase 2, the 
resulting trait profiles were rated along the dimension of overall valence 
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by a second set of raters who were unaware of the targets’ original trust 
decisions and their consequences. 
4.3.1.1 Phase 1: Attribution of traits 
4.3.1.1.1 Sample 
A total of 200 participants were recruited for a study on personality 
assessment during an introductory psychology lecture for undergradu-
ate students of the social sciences on the campus of a large German 
university. Sixteen participants were excluded from further analyses 
because they failed to correctly answer at least one out of eight control 
questions regarding the features and monetary outcomes of a binary 
trust game. Two participants were excluded because they failed to un-
derstand what we meant with the term “traits” and listed emotions or 
cognitions instead. The remaining sample of 182 persons comprised 98 
(53.8%) females and 84 (46.2%) males aged between 18 and 36 years (M 
= 23.73, SD = 3.13). Three randomly selected participants were awarded 
with cash prizes of €150, €100, and €50, respectively. 
4.3.1.1.2 Procedure 
Subjects first learned about the general features and consequences 
of a one-shot binary trust game involving the same properties and pay-
off structure as in Study 1. Thereafter, participants answered six con-
trol questions concerning the potential monetary outcomes for Person A 
(the trustor) and Person B (the trustee). 
Subsequently, we independently manipulated two factors in a 2x3 
between-subjects experimental design, leading to a total of six condi-
tions with 29 to 32 valid cases per condition. 
Target’s trust decision. Similar to Study 1, participants were told 
that Person A had either kept the €5 (i.e., distrusted) or sent the €5 to 
Person B (i.e., trusted). 
Feedback. We systematically manipulated information on Person 
B’s trustworthiness independent of Person A’s previously stated deci-
sion. As a baseline condition, we provided no feedback at all. In the se-
cond condition, we provided negative feedback on Person B’s trustwor-
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thiness, i.e., it was stated that the trustee had (or would have) kept the 
whole €20 and sent nothing back to the trustor. In the third condition, 
we provided positive feedback, meaning that the trustee had (or would 
have) split the €20 equally and sent €10 back to the trustor. 
Because the experimental design was somewhat more complex 
than that of Study 1, we implemented two additional multiple-choice 
control questions immediately after the manipulation. This allowed us 
to ensure that all participants in the final sample understood whether 
Person A had decided to trust or not to trust, whether Person B had (or 
would have) reciprocated or defected, or whether there was no infor-
mation on the trustee’s decision. 
Participants were told that they were about to evaluate the person-
ality of an unknown person who had participated in the trust game de-
scribed above in the role of Person A. Specifically, they were asked to 
freely list five personality traits they would attribute to Person A, given 
her decision in the trust game. Thereafter, participants indicated how 
they would decide in the role of Person A if they were in a similar situa-
tion. Finally, participants answered some questions concerning their 
basic sociodemographic data and were thanked and dismissed. 
4.3.1.2 Phase 2: Rating of trait profiles 
4.3.1.2.1 Sample 
A total of 64 participants were recruited for a study on personality 
assessment on the campus of a large German university. The sample 
comprised 31 (48.4%) females and 33 (51.6%) males aged between 19 
and 33 years (M = 23.59, SD = 2.66). Thirteen randomly selected partic-
ipants were awarded cash prizes ranging from €10 to €100. 
4.3.1.2.2 Procedure 
The traits freely associated by participants in Phase 1 were correct-
ed for spelling errors and retyped to build experimental vignettes. For 
each vignette, traits were arranged in the same order as provided by the 
raters in Phase 1. The resulting 182 personality profiles were randomly 
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divided into three batches. Each individual rater handled one batch 
consisting of approximately 60 profiles. 
Raters were told that each vignette would contain a short personal-
ity profile of a person with a rating scale underneath. They were asked 
to indicate their overall impression of a person characterized by the 
listed traits. All ratings were captured on seven-point Likert-type scales 
ranging from “very negative” to “very positive” and referring to the global 
evaluation of each person. As a consequence of the mixed between-
/within-subjects rating procedure, each vignette was evaluated by 21 to 
22 different raters. Because of the high concordance between raters 
within all three batches of profiles (all ICC > .98), the ratings of each 
profile were averaged across raters and used as the dependent variable 
in the subsequent analysis. 
4.3.2 Results 
As a first step, five student assistants checked all associated traits 
for synonyms using a German thesaurus. For example, related words 
such as “stupid”, “dumb”, or “simple” were recoded as “dumb”, and re-
lated words such as “clever”, “smart”, or “intelligent” were recoded as 
“smart”. Using this method, we generated a list of 26 overarching traits, 
each one being mentioned by at least five different raters. For each of 
these traits, we defined a binary variable indicating whether the respec-
tive trait appeared within a given profile. Using a series of chi-square 
tests, we subsequently analyzed which traits were associated more often 
with trustful than with distrustful behavior and vice versa (see Table 3). 
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Table 3: Inferred traits split by the target’s trust decision 
 Target’s trust decision   
 Keep €5 
(distrust) 
(n = 91) 
Send €5 
(trust) 
(n = 91) 
  
Trait n % n % χ² p 
Altruistic 0 0.0 36 39.6 44.88*** <.001 
Cooperative 0 0.0 10 11.0 10.58** <.01 
Fair 0 0.0 13 14.3 14.00*** <.001 
Gullible 0 0.0 35 38.5 43.33*** <.001 
Nice 0 0.0 25 27.5 28.98*** <.001 
Open 0 0.0 9 9.9 9.47** <.01 
Optimistic 0 0.0 22 24.2 25.03*** <.001 
Risk-seeking 0 0.0 47 51.6 63.36*** <.001 
Social 0 0.0 19 20.9 21.22*** <.001 
Trustful 1 1.1 26 28.6 27.18*** <.001 
Trustworthy 0 0.0 11 12.1 11.71*** <.001 
Calculative 3 3.3 4 4.4 0.15 .70 
Dumb 4 4.4 3 3.3 0.15 .70 
Foresightful 3 3.3 9 9.9 3.21 .07 
Self-confident 3 3.3 2 2.2 0.21 .65 
Smart 8 8.8 11 12.1 0.53 .47 
Distrustful 33 36.3 0 0.0 40.31*** <.001 
Egoistic 63 69.2 13 14.3 56.48*** <.001 
Greedy 14 15.4 2 2.2 9.87** <.01 
Insecure 5 5.5 0 0.0 5.14* <.05 
Pessimistic 9 9.9 0 0.0 9.47** <.01 
Rational 17 18.7 4 4.4 9.10** <.01 
Realistic 8 8.8 0 0.0 8.37** <.01 
Risk-averse 52 57.1 0 0.0 72.80*** <.001 
Thrifty 21 23.1 0 0.0 23.74*** <.001 
Unsocial 10 11.0 0 0.0 10.58** <.01 
Note. N = 182. Only traits mentioned by at least five different raters were considered.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. ** p < .001.  
The traits inferred on the basis of trustful versus distrustful behav-
ior differed considerably. Out of the 26 most frequently mentioned 
traits, eleven were associated significantly more frequently with trust, 
and ten were associated significantly more frequently with distrust. As 
Table 1 suggests, a majority of traits appeared to relate predominantly 
to perceptions of warmth (e.g., “altruistic”, “egoistic”, “nice”, “greedy”), 
whereas a minority seemed to relate to competence (e.g., “gullible”, “ra-
tional”, “realistic”). Some traits were difficult to classify in terms of ei-
ther warmth or competence (e.g., “risk-seeking”, “risk-averse”). 
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Behavior in the trust game served as a cue for inferences concern-
ing trust and trustworthiness on a trait level. Sending the €5 called 
forth inferences including “trustful” and “trustworthy”, whereas keeping 
the money frequently led to trait inferences such as “distrustful”. Fur-
thermore, trustful and distrustful behaviors were often perceived in 
terms of risk-taking. Trustful targets were said to be “risk-seeking”, and 
distrustful targets were characterized as “risk-averse”. 
Beyond these inferences pertaining to trust and risk, targets who 
sent the €5 were frequently described as “altruistic”, “cooperative”, 
“fair”, “nice”, “social”, “open”, and “optimistic”. However, they were also 
said to be “gullible”. 
In contrast, targets who kept the €5 were said to be “egoistic”, 
“greedy”, “thrifty”, “unsocial”, “insecure”, and “pessimistic”. However, 
distrustful behavior also evoked arguably positive inferences such as 
“rational” and “realistic”. 
In the following sections, we will systematically explore how trust 
and distrust shaped global perceptions of overall valence and whether 
these were moderated by social projection and consequentialism. 
On average, 63.2% of raters in Phase 1 would have trusted in the 
same situation; 36.8% indicated that they would have kept their en-
dowment. Raters’ own hypothetical trust decisions were dependent on 
neither the target’s trust decision (χ²(1, N = 182) = 0.59, p = .44) nor 
feedback on Person B’s trustworthiness (χ²(1, N = 182) = 1.02, p = .60). 
This means that raters did not unreflectingly follow the target’s exam-
ple, nor did they factor in information on Person B’s trustworthiness. 
Because the rater’s hypothetical trust decision was unrelated to the tar-
get’s decision and feedback, all three variables could be utilized as ex-
planatory variables in a three-way ANOVA with perceptions of valence 
as the dependent variable. 
Overall perceptions of valence were subject to a significant main ef-
fect of the target’s trust decision (F(1, 170) = 374.40, p < .001). On aver-
age, traits associated with trustful behavior were judged considerably 
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more positively (M = 5.42, SD = 0.91) than were traits associated with 
distrustful behavior (M = 2.67, SD = 0.95). 
The main effect of the target’s trust decision was qualified by a sig-
nificant interaction between the target’s decision and the rater’s own 
hypothetical decision (F(1, 170) = 34.12, p < .001). Raters adjusted their 
trait inferences with regard to whether they would have trusted or dis-
trusted in a similar situation (see Figure 7). Bonferroni-corrected multi-
ple comparisons revealed that distrustful targets were perceived more 
favorably by distrustful (M = 3.23, SD = 0.96) than by trustful (M = 2.37, 
SD = 0.80) raters (p < .001), whereas trustful targets were judged even 
more benevolently by trustful (M = 5.70, SD = 0.56) than by distrustful 
(M = 4.99, SD = 1.15) raters (p < .001). However, these results also indi-
cate that not only trustful but also distrustful raters perceived trustful 
targets considerably more benevolently compared with distrustful tar-
gets (both p < .001). 
No other effects were significant (0.11 < F < 2.60, .08 < p < .74). 
Specifically, raters solely accounted for targets’ decisions to trust or to 
distrust and not for the consequences of these decisions. Whether trust 
or distrust turned out to be warranted or unwarranted played no role 
with regard to global evaluations of personality (F(2, 170) = 0.64, p = 
.53). 
Figure 7: Global evaluations as a function of the target’s stated and 
the rater’s hypothetical trust decisions 
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4.3.3 Discussion 
The results indicate that global evaluations of personality based on 
others’ trust decisions were subject to social projection but not to con-
sequentialism. Social projection affected the perception of trust with re-
gard to both distrustful and trustful behavior. Specifically, distrustful 
targets were judged less negatively if raters indicated that they would 
also have distrusted in the same situation compared with how distrust-
ful targets were judged if the raters would have trusted. Likewise, trust-
ful targets received less positive judgments if raters would not have 
trusted compared with how trustful targets were judged if the raters 
would have been willing to trust. However, social projection was not 
powerful enough to suppress the positive main effect of trust on global 
evaluations. In fact, the effect size for the main effect of the target’s 
trust decision (η²partial = .69) surpassed the effect size for the interaction 
between the target’s and the rater’s trust decisions (η²partial = .17) many 
times over. Traits associated with trustful behavior were judged more 
positively than were traits associated with distrustful behavior regard-
less of whether raters would have trusted in a similar situation. 
Consequentialism played no considerable role in the social percep-
tion of trust decisions. Trustful behavior categorically called forth more 
positive inferences than did distrustful behavior regardless of whether 
trust was (or would have been) rewarded or exploited. The results sug-
gest that people primarily judge the act of trusting or distrusting itself 
and not its consequences. This means that the social perception of trust 
and distrust followed a deontological logic rather than a consequential-
ist logic. In terms of reputation, trust is a winning strategy even if it is 
exploited rather than rewarded. At first glance, these findings appear to 
contradict those of previous studies concerned with the role of outcome-
related information in the social judgment of financial and moral deci-
sions (Baron, & Hershey, 1988; Gino, Shu, & Bazerman, 2010; Lipshitz, 
1998; Lipshitz, & Barak, 1995). However, previous research on the de-
terminants of trust indicates that individual trust decisions do not fol-
low a consequentialist logic (Dunning, & Fetchenhauer, 2010; Dunning 
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et al., 2012; Fetchenhauer, & Dunning, 2009, 2012). Apparently, the 
social perception of trust decisions is similarly non-consequentialist. 
4.4 General discussion 
Both studies painted an overall positive picture of the social per-
ception of trust. On average, trustful behavior conveyed considerable 
reputational benefits. Even though trust entails undeniable potential for 
ambiguity, trustful behavior was perceived positively in terms of 
warmth, as Study 1 demonstrated. Even though individual acts of trust 
may sometimes be motivated by mere self-interest, most observers 
judged trustfulness as a signal of morality on a trait level. Most notably, 
even observers who would not have trusted in a similar situation did 
not scrutinize other’s trustfulness for selfish motives, nor did they ex-
hibit greater understanding for distrust. Rather, trust appeared to sig-
nal good intent and evoked universally positive inferences concerning 
warmth, which is in accordance with previous results by Krueger et al. 
(2008). 
With regard to competence, Study 1 showed that a large majority of 
observers claimed that they would have trusted in a similar situation 
and perceived trustful behavior as a signal of high competence. Howev-
er, a minority of observers who would not have trusted perceived trust-
fulness as a signal of incompetence, whereas they associated distrust 
with competence. Apparently, there is some inherent ambiguity regard-
ing whether trust is related to being smart or gullible, and observers’ 
own willingness to trust determines which interpretation prevails. 
How did perceptions of warmth and competence inferred from 
trustful or distrustful behavior translate into global evaluations of char-
acter? In accordance with previous studies indicating the primacy and 
prevalence of warmth in social judgment (Cuddy et al., 2011; Fiske et 
al., 2007; Wojciszke, 1994, 2005), we found in Study 2 that trust be-
havior was indeed more frequently interpreted in terms of warmth than 
in terms of competence. Similarly, global evaluations appeared to more 
closely follow the pattern for warmth than the pattern for competence 
72 
 
observed in Study 1 (compare Figures 5, 6, & 7). In terms of global 
evaluations, trustful behavior was universally judged more positively 
than was distrustful behavior regardless of whether observers would 
have trusted in a similar situation. However, Study 1 showed that social 
projection had a distinct bearing on judgments of competence, which 
may have contributed to the slight but significant effect of social projec-
tion on the global evaluations of character that we observed in Study 2. 
Thus, observers actually adjusted their overall impressions dependent 
on their own willingness to trust in a similar situation, but not funda-
mentally so. 
Furthermore, one should keep in mind that distrustful observers 
were clearly a minority. It bears mentioning that the observed high will-
ingness to trust is not an artifact of social desirability or of the hypo-
thetical nature of raters’ decisions. Compared with previous studies fea-
turing one-shot binary anonymous trust games with real monetary in-
centives, the hypothetical trust rates observed in Study 1 and Study 2 
did not considerably differ from previous results (e.g., Fetchenhauer, & 
Dunning, 2009, 2010, 2012), indicating that most people would indeed 
decide to trust in such a situation. 
Researchers struggle to explain why people trust each other. At low 
odds of winning or reciprocation, people are more likely to trust than to 
gamble on a lottery featuring the same risks and potential payoffs 
(Fetchenhauer, & Dunning, 2012). Expectations of others’ trustworthi-
ness play only a minor role in trust decisions, and people systematically 
underestimate their peers’ trustworthiness. However, many are still will-
ing to trust, even if they should not do so given their own cynical expec-
tations (Dufwenberg, & Gneezy, 2000; Cox, 2004; Fetchenhauer, & 
Dunning, 2009). 
Our findings may help to explain these puzzling results by sup-
porting the view that trust may serve as a social signal promoting a 
trustor’s reputation as a valuable cooperation partner (Dunning et al., 
2012). Trustful people appear in any case to be warm, and only in the 
worst case to be incompetent (i.e., in the unlikely case of being judged 
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by an observer who would not trust in a similar situation). Likewise, 
distrustful people appear in any case to be cold, and only in the best 
case to be competent. Therefore, and because judgments of warmth 
dominate person perception (Cuddy et al., 2011; Fiske et al., 2007; 
Wojciszke, 1994, 2005), trust is a “winning strategy” in terms of reputa-
tion. 
Although trust is a double-edged sword, especially in the frame of 
the trust game, most people associate trustful behavior with high levels 
of warmth and competence, and traits inferred from behavioral trust are 
eminently favorable. These obvious reputational benefits are likely to 
transcend or offset the mere economic benefits or costs that single in-
stances of trustful behavior may convey. After all, who would not want 
to be liked and respected? 
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5 Integrative discussion 
5.1 Key messages 
Across a total of four studies, it has become unmistakably clear 
that seemingly minor and isolated acts of prosociality can greatly affect 
the ways in which people are perceived and evaluated by their peers. In 
the framework of biological markets established in the introduction, 
performing a good deed, even as an isolated minor event, might consid-
erably impact the market value of an individual, both as an intimate 
and cooperative partner.  
However, doing good is not always a magic bullet. The results 
presented in Chapters 2 and 3 indicated that prosocial behavior strong-
ly impacted desirability as a long-term romantic partner, but had con-
siderably weaker effects on short-term sexual desirability. Similarly, the 
studies presented in Chapter 4 indicated that judgments relevant to the 
value of an individual as a cooperative partner were dependent on the 
observers’ own propensity for doing good. Depending on the situation, 
doing good might have a strong or a negligible effect on the market val-
ue of an individual as an intimate or cooperative partner. However, it is 
of paramount importance to stress that doing good did never yield a 
negative effect. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, even in their short-
term mate choices, neither women nor men appeared to exhibit a weak-
ness for “bad boys” or “bad girls”, at least as long as physical attractive-
ness was held constant. Similarly, even the detrimental effects of social 
projection on the competence ratings observed in Chapter 4 were ren-
dered negligible by the large and strong positive effect on ratings of 
warmth. In terms of value as an intimate or cooperative partner, the 
first key message concerning all studies is that performing good deeds 
actually yields benefits most of the time and does not appear to hurt the 
reputation of an individual anytime.  
The question of whether doing good is actually worth the cost is 
difficult to answer. Whereas advocates of the costly signaling theory 
emphasize that signals must be particularly costly to discourage imita-
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tion (e.g., Gintis et al., 2001; Lotem et al., 2003; Zahavi, 1977; Zahavi, 
& Zahavi, 1996), throughout all studies we employed signals that did 
not exceed a monetary value of €5 (Chapters 2 and 4) and €10 (Chap-
ter3), respectively. It is highly questionable whether these minor in-
vestments conveyed a signal concerning an individual’s wealth or re-
source-holding potential. Particularly, the freely associated traits pre-
sented in Study 2 of Chapter 4 did not indicate that trustful behavior 
was associated with wealth. Rather, it appears that prosocial behavior, 
at least in the context of low-stakes experimental games, was arguably 
exclusively associated with personality. Therefore, a second key mes-
sage might be that doing good does not necessarily need to be particu-
larly costly to convey important information concerning the good char-
acter of an individual. Even minor good deeds can be valuable displays 
of the quality of an individual as an intimate or cooperative partner. 
The results reported in Chapters 2 and 3 might also pave the way 
for a new approach to show how multiple traits (and signals thereof) are 
integrated in the perception of others. Consistent with the cognitive per-
spective of mate choice outlined in Chapter 3 (Miller, & Todd, 1998), 
physical attractiveness (as a signal of health and good genes) and 
prosocial behavior (as a signal of a good character) interacted substan-
tially in the context of long-term mating, leading to the notion that 
overall desirability was the product rather than the sum of its parts. In 
other words, if multiple traits are sufficiently relevant to an individual’s 
value as a partner, these traits were not linearly integrated. Rather, the 
impact of each trait on overall evaluations depended on the degree of 
fulfillment of other traits. Possibly, the effects observed in Chapters 2 
and 3 are not limited only to long-term mate choice, but pertain to other 
subsets of biological markets, i.e., all subsets where multiple traits of 
potential partners are highly relevant to reproductive fitness. Therefore, 
a third key message is that prosociality and signals thereof should al-
ways be regarded in the context of other traits. 
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5.2 Further implications and critical appraisal 
A common weakness of previous research investigating the role of 
prosocial behavior in the choice of intimate and cooperation partners 
might be that often only focal traits or signals thereof were experimen-
tally manipulated, while other traits were implicitly regarded as con-
stant (e.g., Farrelly, 2011; Kelly, & Dunbar, 2001). However, this ap-
proach might generate skewed and over- or understated results regard-
ing the relevance of these traits in focal subsets of biological markets 
(e.g., the mating market). Humans typically infer latent traits (e.g., mo-
rality or competence) on the basis of other, easily observable traits (e.g., 
physical attractiveness), as studies concerning the “what is beautiful is 
good” heuristic have indicated (Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972; Eagly, 
Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 1991; Feingold, 1992). Similarly, people 
typically categorize others and frequently fall prey to stereotypes (e.g., 
Macrae, & Bodenhausen, 2000). Thus, manipulating isolated traits or 
signals thereof likely causes subjects to (unwittingly) relate these sig-
nals or traits to other traits, which might not be the focus of the respec-
tive study. For example, prosocial behavior might be associated with 
chastity, attractiveness with dominance, warmth with competence, and 
so on. Thus, researchers should not assume that subjects interpret the 
signals intended to pertain to a focal trait in isolation. Rather, stereo-
types and categorical thinking might lead to further inferences extend-
ing far beyond the scope of the original signals or focal traits.  
Furthermore, studies using manipulations of physical attractive-
ness might benefit from the methods presented in Chapters 2 and 3. 
One must consider that stimuli differ in a multitude of dimensions oth-
er than attractiveness. Social cognition research shows that humans 
are quick to infer traits, such as warmth, competence, or social domi-
nance, from the faces of others (e.g., Oosterhof, & Todorov, 2008; 
Todorov, Baron, & Oosterhof, 2008; Todorov, Pakashi, & Oosterhof, 
2009). Moreover, according to studies using a thin-slices paradigm, the-
se inferences are often accurate (e.g., Ambady, Bernieri, & Richeson, 
2000; Ambady, & Rosenthal, 1992; Carney, Colvin, & Hall, 2007; Carré, 
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McCormick, & Mondloch, 2009; Fetchenhauer, Groothuis, & Pradel, 
2010). Therefore, two stimuli differing or not differing in physical attrac-
tiveness are statistically likely to differ in a multitude of other dimen-
sions of social perception. For example, two male stimuli with the same 
physical attractiveness score might differ substantially regarding per-
ceptions of other traits, such as dominance and aggressiveness, e.g., if 
one is clean-shaven and the other is bearded or if their facial width-to-
height ratio differs (Carré, McCormick, & Mondloch, 2009; Neave, & 
Shields, 2008). In consequence, many traits other than physical attrac-
tiveness are quickly inferred on the basis of physical appearance and 
might influence the value of an individual as a mate or cooperative 
partner. Therefore investigating the role of physical attractiveness is on-
ly meaningful if the experimenter provides a large randomized sample of 
stimuli, so that varying inferences drawn from the physical appearance 
of these stimuli will likely cancel each other out.  
In the present research, I relied on decisions in economic games 
as proxies for altruism, trustworthiness, and trust. Although it is not 
certain whether economic games validly and appropriately measure the 
respective constructs (e.g., Camerer, & Fehr, 2004; Bardsley, 2008; 
Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, Soutter, 2000), these games, to the best 
of my knowledge, are suitable proxies for more abstract and general 
moral traits and social preferences potentially underlying altruistic, 
trustworthy, and trustful behaviors. Previous studies have established 
correlations between altruism, trustworthiness, and trust (Ashraf, 
Bohnet, & Piankov, 2006; Evans, & Revelle, 2008; Kanagaretnam, 
Mestelman, Nainar, & Shehata, 2009), suggesting that these traits are 
more or less strongly associated with some generalized propensity to 
perform good deeds. Indeed, the results of Chapter 4 indicate that in-
vestments in the trust game were frequently associated with altruism, 
trustworthiness, and fairness. Even if trust might conceptually differ 
from trustworthiness and altruism (e.g., Ashraf, Bohnet, & Piankov, 
2006; Cox, 2004), it remains questionable whether outside observers 
actually differentiate between these concepts. The observers likely 
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framed the behavior of the targets into general categories of morally 
good or bad. Future research must clarify whether these behaviors and 
the underlying traits are clearly distinguished in social perception.  
In addition, I would like to address some concerns regarding the 
value of prosocial behavior as a sexual or social signal. I have repeatedly 
stressed that “doing good does you good”, i.e., that third parties perceive 
prosocial behavior as a signal revealing an individual’s good character. I 
concluded that in many subsets of biological markets, and under most 
circumstances, prosocial behavior exerts a positive influence on the 
market value of an individual, e.g., as a romantic or cooperative part-
ner. However, prosocial behavior might sometimes be strategically moti-
vated and guided through a desire to burnish one’s image (Olson, 1965; 
Becker, 1974). Awareness of this fact might lead observers to a com-
plete or partial devaluation of prosocial behavior as a signal of good 
character. Similarly, a signal might be more powerful if the chance of 
being observed is low rather than high, as the signal would consequent-
ly lack the potential for strategic motivation. People might intuitively 
appraise selfless behavior more when the target person is faced with a 
strong temptation to behave selfishly due to the privacy of the situation. 
This notion might also explain why not all people behave exceedingly 
prosocial under conditions of high publicity (Bereczkei, Birkas, & 
Kerekes, 2007, 2010; Birkas, Bereczkei, Kerekes, 2006; Hardy, & Van 
Vugt, 2006), and not all people behave exceedingly selfishly under con-
ditions of high privacy (Eckel, & Grossman, 1996; Forsythe, Horowitz, 
Savin, & Sefton, 1994; Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, 1994; 
Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996). The higher the probability of obser-
vation, the less valuable the prosociality signal might be; conversely, the 
lower the probability of observation, the more valuable the prosociality 
signal might be. This idea might explain why prosociality is not a perfect 
correlate of publicity, as a lower chance of recognition might (at least 
partially) be compensated by a higher chance of appraisal if the signal is 
recognized anyway.  
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Furthermore, prosocial behavior might not reflect good character  
if it is enforced by strong social norms. In such situations, individuals 
might not receive special praise if they abide to the norm, but rather 
lose face if they fail to follow the norm. In this context, it is reasonable 
to differentiate between descriptive and injunctive social norms 
(Cialdini, 2012; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). While injunctive 
norms refer to “what others approve”, descriptive norms denote “what 
others do” (Cialdini et al, 1990, p. 1015). Regarding a given behavior, 
injunctive and descriptive norms might be considerably different. For 
example, a majority of people might approve of donating blood (injunc-
tive norm), but only a minority actually donate blood (descriptive norm). 
I would argue that the impact of prosocial behavior as a social and sex-
ual signal is strongest when injunctive norms are strong, and descrip-
tive norms are weak, i.e., when most people would approve of a behav-
ior but only few people would actually behave in such a way. This no-
tion might also lead to a re-evaluation of the second key message, 
namely that prosocial behavior does not necessarily need to be costly. 
In the framework of injunctive and descriptive social norms, it seems 
reasonable that costly prosocial behavior would receive more praise 
than less costly prosocial behavior, as costly prosocial acts will arguably 
be less prescribed through descriptive norms. For example, most people 
would approve of offering one’s seat to a handicapped person on a 
crowded bus, just as most people would approve of rescuing a drowning 
child from a wild current. However, while many people would offer their 
seat on the bus, considerably fewer people would jump into the icy wa-
ter, rendering the descriptive norm much weaker in the latter example. 
This rationale might also explain previous findings indicating that dis-
plays of altruism combined with bravery have considerably stronger ef-
fects on the desirability of males than displays of altruism without 
bravery (Kelly, & Dunbar, 2001), as bravery is very costly and only few 
men are brave.   
Moreover, it remains to be discussed whether the effects of 
prosocial behavior as sexual and social signals in biological markets can 
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provide a reasonable explanation for the evolution of human 
prosociality. I propose that there is no single workable theory with re-
spect to all instances of human prosocial behavior. The inclusive fitness 
theory (Dawkins, 1989; Hamilton, 1964; Williams, 1966) is a powerful 
tool to explain the evolution of prosociality, and this theory can be ap-
plied to a wide range of prosocial behaviors where actors and recipients 
are genetically related (West et al., 2011). Similarly, the theory of recip-
rocal altruism (Axelrod, & Hamilton, 1981; Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; 
Trivers, 1971) is perfectly applicable to prosocial behaviors that allow 
repeated interactions between two parties. However, the idea of biologi-
cal markets that foster competition for the most valuable partners via 
signaling the market value of an individual (Barclay, 2013; Noë, & 
Hammerstein, 1994, 1995) might serve as a promising and suitable ap-
proach in many cases where classic explanations fall short.  
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6 Directions for future research 
In the following sections, I will delineate some ideas for future re-
search, building upon and transcending the theoretical foundations and 
empirical work presented in the previous chapters. One unifying theo-
retical consideration underlying the following research ideas is that 
humans populate biological markets, where they strive to identify and 
compete for access to the most desirable intimate and cooperation part-
ners.  
6.1 Traits in context: How and why physical attractiveness and 
prosocial behavior jointly shape perceptions of desirability 
The results presented in Chapters 2 and 3 provide empirical sup-
port for the idea that cues for important fitness-relevant traits in a po-
tential mate are not integrated in a linear, additive way, but rather in-
teract non-linearly to shape global perceptions of desirability (Miller, & 
Todd, 1998). In long-term mating, where both physical attractiveness 
(as a signal of health and good genes) and prosocial behavior (as a sig-
nal of a good character) are highly relevant, the impact of displays of 
prosocial behavior on the ratings of desirability was dependent on the 
physical attractiveness of the potential partners and vice versa. This 
observation suggested that kindness played a larger role if the potential 
partner was attractive rather than unattractive, and that attractiveness 
had a larger influence if the potential partner was kind rather than un-
kind. From a theoretical perspective, this idea makes sense, as it would 
not be adaptive for excess with regard to one trait to perfectly substitute 
for the complete lack of another (Miller, & Todd, 1998). The data ob-
tained in Chapters 2 and 3 is consistent with these considerations. 
However, there might be alternative explanations for the observed ef-
fects. 
First, judgments of attractiveness appear to be strongly correlated 
with judgments of trustworthiness (Todorov, Baron, & Oosterhof, 2008), 
ascribed to the so-called “what is beautiful is good” heuristic (Dion, 
Berscheid, & Walster, 1972). Therefore, exposure to physically attractive 
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stimuli may evoke implicit expectations of moral behavior. In natural 
environments, information on physical appearance is typically expected 
to precede information on pro- or antisocial behavior. Thus, strong ex-
pectations of moral behavior, derived from the physical attractiveness of 
others, might lead to a “beauty premium”; i.e., in case of doubt, attrac-
tive people might be treated as if they were moral. If attractive people 
adhere to these high expectations by actually behaving in a prosocial 
way, this adherence might not necessarily boost their desirability even 
further. However, if attractive people fail to live up to the high expecta-
tions of others, these individuals might experience a considerable 
“beauty penalty”, expressed as a withdrawal of the advanced premium. 
According to Wilson and Eckel (2006), attractive trustees are indeed 
viewed as more trustworthy and consequently given a beauty premium, 
i.e., they are trusted more often. However, attractive trustors are also 
expected to behave more trustfully than unattractive trustors and un-
dergo a beauty penalty if they fail to satisfy the trustees’ high expecta-
tions, i.e., they receive less in return compared with unattractive 
trustors, who are expected to be less trustful (Wilson, & Eckel, 2006). If 
such a beauty penalty, resulting from the violation of the high expecta-
tions of others, is the driving force behind the effects observed in Chap-
ters 2 and 3, attractive people should not necessarily benefit more from 
behaving in a prosocial way than less attractive people, but these indi-
viduals might receive more condemnation following antisocial behavior. 
Second, facial attractiveness in males has been shown to be a 
predictor for defective behavior across four different experimental games 
(although this was not the case for females) (Takahashi, Yamagishi, 
Tanida, Kiyonari, & Kanazawa, 2006). Similarly, higher fluctuating 
asymmetry in males and higher body mass index in females (which are 
both important predictors for attractiveness in males and females, re-
spectively; see Cornelissen, Toveé, & Bateson, 2009; Gangestad, 
Thornhill, & Yeo, 1994) have been associated with lower offers in the 
ultimatum game (Zaatari, & Trivers, 2007). In the light of Gangestad 
and Simpson’s (2000) theory of strategic pluralism, one might assume 
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that highly attractive people simply do not have to be prosocial and kind 
to succeed in mating, and often moral behavior might merely be an ef-
fort to compensate for a lack of attractiveness. Therefore, those who do 
not really need to be moral (i.e., highly attractive people) might receive 
even more praise for behaving morally than those who need to be moral 
to succeed in mating (i.e., less attractive people). If this is the case, then 
one may expect attractive people to receive more praise for prosocial be-
havior compared with unattractive people, but not necessarily more 
condemnation for antisocial behavior. 
The validity of these explanations might be investigated in a more 
refined experimental design, building on the experiment employed in 
Chapter 3. In a first step, one might record short video clips of female 
and male targets with various levels of physical attractiveness. In a se-
cond step, these videos would be presented to raters of the opposite sex. 
Each video would be presented twice to each rater. After the first pas-
sage, the raters would judge the respective target’s physical attractive-
ness and estimate how the target would decide as a trustee in a one-
shot binary trust game featuring the same properties as employed in 
Chapter 3. Judgments of physical attractiveness and expectations of 
trustworthiness could be captured on Likert-type scales with probability 
ratings for the latter. Subsequently, the video would be shown for a se-
cond time with information on the target’s alleged decision displayed on 
screen. The information should be varied between subjects and allow for 
a “no information” condition, suggesting that each target would be pre-
sented as either trustworthy, untrustworthy, or no information on the 
target’s actual decision would be displayed. After the second passage, 
the raters would judge the target’s desirability as a long-term intimate 
partner.  
In the subsequent analysis it would be possible to assess how 
perceptions of physical attractiveness are associated with expectations 
of trustworthiness. More importantly, one might obtain insight on how 
information on the target’s alleged behavior (either consistent or incon-
sistent with the stated expectations) influences desirability ratings com-
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pared with the no-information treatment, where raters can be expected 
to solely rely on judgments of physical attractiveness and expectations 
of the target’s trustworthiness. Specifically, one might examine whether 
attractive targets (as compared to less attractive targets) actually benefit 
more from behaving in a trustworthy way, or whether these individuals 
lose more from behaving in an untrustworthy way, or both.  
A more elaborate variant of this experimental design might also 
allow for targets to make an actual decision as trustees after the record-
ing of the videos. This experiment might answer the question of whether 
attractiveness is associated with actual moral behavior and potentially 
replicate the finding that humans validly identify the moral dispositions 
of others, even after short exposure, as a recent study using a thin-
slices paradigm suggests (Fetchenhauer, Groothuis, & Pradel, 2010).  
6.2 Doing good as social signal: How social norms, publicity, and 
costs of doing good influence the signaling value of social be-
haviors 
In the previous chapter (5.2) I discussed the idea that the positive 
or negative value of social behaviors (i.e., “behaviors which have a fit-
ness consequence for both the actor and the recipient”, West et al., 
2011, p. 232) as sexual and social signals in biological markets might 
be subject to at least four factors: the injunctive norm pertaining to the 
situation (i.e., “what others approve”), the descriptive norm (i.e., “what 
others do”), publicity (i.e., the probability of being observed), and the 
cost of doing good (compared with behaving selfishly).  
Whether social behaviors generally qualify as positive or negative 
signals concerning the moral character of the actor should depend on 
injunctive norms pertaining to the respective behaviors, i.e., social be-
haviors approved by others might have potential to be positive signals, 
and social behaviors disapproved by others are potentially negative sig-
nals. However, the magnitude of potentially positive or negative signals 
should be contingent on the respective descriptive norms, publicity, and 
costs of prosocial versus selfish behavior. 
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If there is only a weak descriptive norm to do good, i.e., if only few 
people engage in prosocial behavior, it can be assumed that prosocial 
behavior will be met with more praise, but selfish behavior will also be 
regarded with less contempt than if there is a strong descriptive norm to 
do good.  
If prosocial behavior is likely to be observed by others and there-
fore has great potential to be used as a strategic signal, then this behav-
ior might be devaluated as a signal of a good character. However, selfish 
behavior might be perceived as even more impertinent and outrageous if 
it occurs in broad daylight and under the watchful eyes of others than if 
it is unlikely to be discovered.  
If doing good is costly compared with behaving selfishly, prosocial 
behavior might be valued more strongly as signal of good character than 
if doing good is less costly. However, observers might also be more sym-
pathetic about selfish behavior if behaving in a prosocial manner is ex-
tremely costly to the actor.   
Thus, I argue that prosocial behavior (i.e., behavior that others 
approve of) will be highly valued if only few others would do the same, if 
it yields little potential for observation by others, and if it is costly to the 
actor. The signaling value of performing good deeds will be least if many 
others would do the same, if these acts are public and therefore bear 
great potential for being observed and yield little costs to the actor. 
Similarly, selfish behavior (i.e., behavior that others do not ap-
prove of) would provoke the greatest moral outrage if most others would 
likely do otherwise, if this behavior was performed in public and doing 
the right thing would cost little. However, selfish behavior will be most 
forgivable if only few would do otherwise, if this behavior was not public 
and doing the right thing would be very costly.  
The joint influence of the above-mentioned factors might be ex-
perimentally investigated using the decisions of trustees in a one-shot 
binary trust game featuring the same properties and payoff structure as 
described in Chapters 3 and 4, serving as the respective social behav-
iors. As reported in Chapter 3, the behavior of the trustees is subject to 
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moral judgment. There is a strong injunctive norm prescribing trustwor-
thy behavior, whereas untrustworthy behavior is despised and pun-
ished (Bicchieri, Xiao, & Muldoon, 2011; Charness, Cobo-Reyes, & Ji-
ménez, 2008).  
Using a between-subjects experimental design, one might there-
fore experimentally manipulate information concerning the decisions of 
the targets as trustees in a binary trust game (adherence to injunctive 
norm), the prevalence of the respective behavior among a hypothetical 
reference group (descriptive norm), whether the decision was made in 
public or in private (publicity), and how much money was at stake 
(costs). In a first experiment, all variables could be operationalized as 
binary variables to build a total of 16 experimental vignettes. To manip-
ulate adherence to the injunctive norm and perceptions of costs, the 
vignettes might either state that “Person B decided to keep €100 (/€10) 
and to return €100 (/€10) to Person A”, for trustworthy targets, or that 
“Person B decided to keep €200 (/€20) and to return €0 to Person A”, 
for untrustworthy targets. To manipulate the relevant descriptive norm, 
the vignettes could state that “out of 100 participants assigned to the 
role of Person B, 80 (/20) did likewise”. To manipulate publicity, the vi-
gnettes might claim that “Person B was made aware (/kept unaware) of 
the fact that that his decision would be communicated to others who 
would subsequently evaluate his character based on that decision”.  
The judgments of the target’s personality might be captured using 
free associations (such as in Study 2 of Chapter 4) and closed scales 
pertaining to different favorable (or unfavorable) personality traits (such 
as in Study 1 of Chapter 4). Furthermore, raters might provide overall 
judgments concerning the desirability of the targets as short- and long-
term intimate partners, cooperative partners or friends.  
6.3 Good in some respects, bad in every way? Halo effects in per-
son perception 
In Study 1 of Chapter 4, I reported a considerable positive corre-
lation between judgments of warmth and competence, but only follow-
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ing displays of distrust, suggesting that observers perceived distrustful 
targets as incompetent and cold, whereas observers arrived at more dif-
ferentiated perceptions following displays of trust. Comprehensive re-
search in the domain of social judgment implies that perceptions of 
warmth and competence are often positively associated when judging 
individual targets or behaviors, as compared to judgments of multiple 
targets or social groups (e.g., Cuddy, Glick, & Beninger, 2011; Judd, 
James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, Kashima, 2005). However, the results pre-
sented in Study 1 of Chapter 4 suggest that this so-called “halo effect” 
(Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968) might be particularly pro-
nounced with regard to the perception of persons exhibiting immoral or 
antisocial behaviors. In short, morally bad people might often be judged 
as equally dumb, whereas morally good people might not necessarily be 
judged as equally smart. People often use themselves as (implicit) 
standards in social judgment (Dunning, & Hayes, 1996) and strive to 
judge themselves as superior to others, particularly in terms of morality 
(Alicke, & Govorun, 2005; Gilovich, Epley, & Hanko, 2005). As a result, 
judgments of immorality might quickly spill over to judgments of in-
competence following the moral transgressions of others. However, the 
morally righteous behavior of others might be appreciated as such, but 
it might be far less likely to unreflectingly spill over to judgments of 
competence. Rather, moral behavior might be thoroughly scrutinized for 
signs of incompetence to attain self-serving compensation for the praise 
of the morality of others.  
One test of this hypothesis might be conducted in the course of 
the study described in Chapter 6.2 by considering trait inferences per-
taining not only to warmth but also to competence (such as in Study 1 
of Chapter 4) and comparing the correlations between perceived warmth 
and competence with regard to whether the respective inferences fol-
lowed accounts of moral or immoral behavior.  
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6.4 Social meta-judgment: Judging how others judge you 
In general, people might behave immorally because they either 
misjudge or underestimate the impact of their moral transgressions on 
the impressions of others or simply do not care about the impressions 
of others, e.g., because they believe to be anonymous or independent of 
the favor of other people. From an evolutionary point of view, I argue 
that most moral transgressors belong to the latter category, i.e., that 
most transgressors simply do not care.  
 However, some advocates of the classic attribution theory might 
likely argue otherwise. Actor-observer asymmetry (Jones, & Nisbett, 
1972; for a meta-analysis, see Malle, 2006) denotes the human tenden-
cy to explain one’s own behavior in situational terms, while explaining 
the behavior of others on the basis of stable dispositions. Self-serving 
bias (Heidler, 1958; for a review, see Campbell, & Sedikides, 1999) de-
notes the tendency to explain outcomes that favor the self on the basis 
of internal attributions (e.g., diligence), while explaining outcomes that 
disfavor the self on the basis of external attributions (e.g., bad luck). 
These two classic theories lead to the prediction that people perceive the 
moral transgressions of others as a telltale sign of a bad character, 
while explaining one’s own moral transgressions as a result of situa-
tional factors and not as signals of moral depravity. However, while self-
serving in the short-run, this tendency might prove extremely maladap-
tive in terms of evolutionary fitness. As ample research on the negativity 
bias in impression formation indicates (for reviews, see Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin, & Royzman, 2001), in 
the eyes of others, morally bad behaviors are more diagnostic of a mor-
ally bad character than morally good behaviors are indicative of a mor-
ally good character (Skowronski, & Carlston, 1989). This observation 
reflects the need for an individual to behave in a morally righteous way 
at all times to be considered truly moral, whereas an immoral person 
might sometimes deviate from immoral behavior but still be considered 
truly immoral (Skowronski, & Carlston, 1992). Therefore, if people failed 
to understand the devastating impact of their moral transgressions on 
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the impressions of others, then people would not be able to successfully 
advertise their value as partners in biological markets. Thus, from an 
evolutionary point of view, humans should be proficient in validly as-
sessing how observers evaluate moral transgressions. The cognitive 
ability to form valid inferences concerning the reputational costs (or 
benefits) of antisocial (or prosocial) acts can be considered a key pre-
requisite in biological markets. In the light of error management theory 
(Haselton, & Buss, 2000), people might possibly even overestimate the 
negative impact of their immoral behavior on the perceptions of others 
to avoid irrevocably ruining their reputation. 
Therefore, it is highly unlikely that individuals possessing an un-
impaired theory of mind (i.e., the cognitive capacity to attribute percep-
tions, opinions, or attitudes to other people; Premack, & Woodruff, 
1978; Baron-Cohen, 1995) would systematically underestimate the im-
pact of their moral transgressions on the impressions of others.  
The first test of this hypothesis might take place within the con-
text of the binary trust game presented in Chapters 3 and 4. Following 
an initial investment by an unknown trustor (Person A), participants in 
the role of the trustee (Person B) would be free to reward the trust by 
returning half of the multiplied amount to the trustor or exploit the 
trust by keeping the whole amount and returning nothing to the 
trustor. Immediately after the decision, each participant would be asked 
to indicate how others would judge his character if they learned about 
his decision. The dependent variables might be similar to those de-
scribed in Chapter 6.2 and should encompass a wide range of personal-
ity traits pertaining to warmth and competence and to overall judg-
ments of desirability as a short- and long-term intimate partner, coop-
erative partner or friend. In a second phase, another group of partici-
pants might be asked to evaluate the personality of an unknown trustee 
along the same dimensions, while considering whether the trustee be-
haved in a trustworthy or untrustworthy way. The ratings provided from 
the perspective of the trustee and the observer could subsequently be 
compared along multiple dimensions to assess whether individuals mis-
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judge or underestimate the impact of their decisions on the impressions 
of others or whether individuals correctly predict the judgments of oth-
ers.  
In a variation of this study, half of the participants in the role of 
the trustee might reflect on the perceptions of others, even before actu-
ally making decisions. There is good reason to believe that even merely 
thinking about the reputational consequences of moral and immoral 
behavior (without actually having to face public opinion) might make 
trustees shy away from behaving in an immoral way, due to the in-
creased salience of the potential negative reputational consequences 
conveyed.   
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7 Closing words 
During the course of the last three years, I learned to take delight 
in finding the little blank spots next to and in between the big questions 
that wiser women and men asked and answered before me. I also pain-
fully learned that asking is easier than answering, and that each ques-
tion that I answered would generate ten new questions that haunted 
and taunted me.  
It seems that science is a bit like trying to fill a square when all you 
are allowed to draw is circles, or vice versa.  
With regard to human nature, I have learned to free myself from 
undue cynicism, have faith in humanity, and appreciate that we, as a 
species, have come a long way – potentially due to our capacity for do-
ing good. I sincerely hope that I convinced you that doing good does you 
good, at least in the long run. 
If you are good at heart, do not hesitate to show it. Rest assured 
that even small acts of charity, virtue, and trust in your fellow man do 
not remain unnoticed. Do not give in to temptation and be patient. 
 
Start today. 
 
“And let us not grow weary of doing good,  
for in due season we will reap, if we do not give up.” 
Galatians 6:9 (ESV) 
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